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The cost-effectiveness problem in acquisition programs is so important to the 
Department of Defense, that the Army Secretariat recently wrote policy to make 
Supportability equal to Cost, Schedule, and Performance in all Army acquisition 
programs.  While this policy approach to logistics support is a step in the right direction, 
the Army has yet to communicate the best way to implement this policy, and the other 
services have yet to adopt such a policy.  This policy is a key Acquisition Strategy that 
focuses on identifying the total system cost. 
The current situation is such that the services will continue to spend dollars and 
develop systems that will cost exponentially more in annual increases over the years the 
systems are in use.  At best, costs are not seen until downstream or in the long-term.  This 
causes us to spend our operations and maintenance dollars on acquisition resulted costs 
long after acquisition dollars have expired.  If we can effectively implement the 
Supportability policy we will can increase supportability factors in acquisition programs, 
make better use of defense dollars, lower life cycle costs, and enhance the war fighters 
mission to carryout out our national defense strategies and initiatives.    
Implementation of the Supportability policy requires transformational change in 
the services.  This study applies change management theories and models to analyze what 
organizational changes will best support the implementation of the Army’s policy on 
making Supportability equal to Cost, Schedule, and Performance.  If implemented 
successfully, the policy has the potential to improve the products from acquisition 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. CHANGING TIMES. 
The Department of Defense is going through significant change-- 
everything is being reduced except commitments.  We are seeing profound 
changes in organizations, budgets, manpower, roles and missions, 
strategies, infrastructure, attention in the media and by the Congress and 
world crises of a different nature.  We are seeing a thrust towards 
privatization and outsourcing of many traditional service functions and a 
revolution in specifications and standards with a bias toward the private 
sector in terms of more convenience for them, less government oversight 
and more influence by them.  Integrated program teams are on the rise, yet 
true teaming in the “Toyota Sense” is lacking and at the same time, there 
is a disenfranchising of logistics influence.  Logistics checks and balances 
such as the Navy’s Logistics Review Group are being either eliminated or 
passed back to the Program Executive Officer.  These changes demand 
that whatever we do in logistics, we must do right.  Now, more than ever 
the culture of logistics must be changed.  We must put logistics and 
logisticians in the spotlight as a science managed by professionals.  The 
Acquisition Logisticians must know their business and be proactive 
visionaries who are compelling and influential in providing the best 
possible support solutions.  (Eaton, 2001) 
 
Eaton’s opening quote sets the direction defense managers and logisticians must 
be ready to head.  The Defense environment has changed and now the Defense 
Department and its logistics and acquisition departments must understand and address the 
changing environment.  Figure 1 below depicts the change trend with respect to defense 
funding.  The dollars available to defense initiatives have steadily decreased over the 
years.  The percentage reductions amount to enormous reductions in the budgets of 
defense organizations.  While Eaton mentioned everything is being reduced, perhaps the 
most difficult reduction to manage in its painful obviousness is the reduction in funding.   
Figure 1 from the Defense Almanac shows the steady decrease in defense 
spending as a part of our federal budgets and public spending (defined as government 





DOD'S SLICE OF THE DOLLAR 
 DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
FISCAL YEAR FEDERAL  OUTLAYS 
NET PUBLIC  
SPENDING 
2001 15.1 9.4 
2000 15.5 9.6 
1999 15.3 9.4 
1998 15.5 9.5 
1997 16.1 9.9 
1996 16.2 10.0 
1995 17.2 10.7 
1994 18.4 11.5 
1993 19.8 12.4 
1992 20.7 13.1 
1991 19.8 12.6 
1990 23.1 14.8 
1989 25.8 16.5 
1988 26.5 17.0 
1987 27.3 17.6 
1986 26.8 17.9 
1985 25.9 17.6 
1984 25.9 17.5 
1983 25.4 17.3 
1982 24.7 16.9 
1981 23.0 15.8 
1980 22.5 15.3 
1975 25.5 16.5 
1970 39.4 25.4 
1965 38.8 25.2 
 







The effect of those decreasing percentages of funding and the increasing pace of 
technology and military commitments has required the military acquisition community to 
find ways to meet the services’ technical needs with less money to source the required 
initiatives.  The reduced defense budget makes the costs of acquisition more important 
than ever.  The Pentagon considers acquisition reform (lowering the costs of acquiring 
weapon systems) to be one of its highest priorities.  In an era of shrinking budgets, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) plans to use the savings from acquisition reform to pay 
for force modernizations (GAO report #NSIAD-97-48).   
 
B. THE SUPPORTABILITY ISSUE. 
Supportability is the degree to which system design characteristics and planned 
logistics resources, including manpower, meet system peacetime requirements and 
wartime utilization requirements.  (Eaton, 2001)  Supportability planning is a requirement 
for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), and budgeting for Supportability 
is one of the biggest challenges to identifying the upfront cost of a program.  The support 
strategy encompasses the logistics support plan executed through the life and use of the 
system.  Some of the areas of consideration for the support strategy and program 
Supportability include product support, affordability improvements, source of support, 
human systems integration, environment, safety, occupational health, and post 
deployment evaluation (DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Directive 5000.2).  Product 
support is one of the most significant considerations due to the fact that it includes system 
reliability, maintainability, availability, and technical improvements.  The possibility of 
cost overruns and program inefficiencies are high once a program gets into product 
support and other Supportability criteria.  The high costs associated with Supportability 
and the overall Total Ownership Costs born by the military, paired with the reduction in 
defense budgets listed in Figure 1, are the reasons why Supportability is an important 
area to manage properly.     
Financing the logistics after development, testing, and production remains a 
burden on defense logistics managers.  “Military Logistics is an important and expensive 
job.  The Defense Department (DOD) will spend about $84 billion out of its $280-billion 
budget (one-third) on logistics support this year.  Even so, failing equipment and parts 
shortages continue to be a problem.  DOD has taken steps to reengineer its logistics 
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process, but many aspects of its overall plan are incomplete, raising questions about 
whether or when the goals of better service and lower costs will be realized.  It is too 
early to assess the impact that reengineering logistics support will have on combat 
forces”  (GAO report #NSIAD-00-89).   
The Logistics Support costs for any military weapon system or vehicle once 
fielded comprises the majority of that program’s cost over its lifetime of use.  (Blanchard, 
1998)  The costs grow higher and higher each year due to the age of the system and a 
lack of commitment to supportability.  Supportability factors and support analysis 
properly and thoroughly developed during the design phase of any system can forecast 
the future cost of a program.  If Supportability were more thoroughly addressed during 
design and testing, the government would reduce total ownership costs by millions of 
dollars after the system is fielded into the services.     
Different parties will debate the causes of support related costs. Obsolescence or 
inadequate performance of hardware, software, and commercial off-the-shelf technology, 
and the rising costs of diminishing manufacturing sources and out-of-production parts are 
documented problems that increase support costs as our weapon systems increase with 
age and use. (Committee on Aging Avionics in Military Aircraft, 2001)  
Costing of logistics support programs in the outyears is nearly 
always an uncontrollable nightmare.  However, given that the Program 
Manager has done his homework and required his contractors to 
effectively and definitively document his program from inception to 
demise, the follow-on logistics support of his system should be attainable 
as its life cycle is extended out beyond the time originally planned for 
obsolescence.  (Case study of restarting a production program twenty five 
years later [author unknown], 1994)  
 
Often a post production analysis will show that a component or system performed 
far below the contractor-stated reliability rates; while the contractor will defend the 
product and counter by professing the system was never intended or designed for the type 
or frequency of use experienced. This has occurred in the past with aircraft parts designed 
for commercial use and then purchased for use in Navy aircraft that land and take off of 
carrier platforms which is much more stressful on the aircraft than landing and taking off 
of airport or airbase runways.  (Eaton, 2001)   
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While support-related cost identification problems and conflicts exist, our current 
weapon systems continue to get older and costlier, requiring more defense dollars and 
delaying the procurement of newer systems.  When Congress approves funding for new 
programs and weapon systems, the acquisition community needs to give increased 
attention to Supportability to properly field weapon systems that will enable the war 
fighter to fight wars and win at a planned and efficient cost.  Without changing from the 
current trend, we will continue to spend dollars and develop inadequate systems (in terms 
of technical capability, and mechanical reliability effecting total ownership costs) that 
will exponentially cost more over the years the systems are in use.  If we can improve 
Supportability and product support in the form of reliability, availability, and 
maintainability, we will make better use of defense dollars, lower life cycle costs, and 
improve the end product our services use to carry out our national defense strategies and 
initiatives. 
 
C. THE ARMY SUPPORTABILITY POLICY. 
Maintaining systems already in service competes against acquisition funds and 
maintains priority for funding over the development of new systems.  These systems in 
use, commonly called legacy systems are what the services know they must have ready to 
fight at the next call to duty.   Maintaining systems already in service also reminds the 
service managers in the logistics field that Supportability and its tenets of Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Availability need to be evaluated with greater degrees of certainty.  
Logistics managers in the field pay Supportability costs for fielded systems with 
Operations and Maintenance funds.  Once fielded, the majority of the associated systems 
Supportability costs do not burden Program Managers’ budgets.  Lessons learned from 
identified avoidable post production costs led to the following excerpt from the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Honorable Paul J. 
Hoeper, dated 27 February 2000: 
Defense acquisition policy holds us accountable for program cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Army Regulation (AR) 10-5 promulgates 
acquisition and logistics management responsibilities that are based in 
Title 10, United States Code for equipping, supplying, training, and 
maintaining for force.  These requirements mean that, at the very inception 
of a materiel solution idea, we must say, “Materiel developers have four, 
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not three, things to consider:  cost, schedule, performance, and 
supportability [emphasis added]. 
 
The following is the actual Supportability policy statement the Army has adopted, 
as written in a memo from the Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army, Acquisition Logistics, and Technology.   
The Department of the Army holds supportability to be co-equal in 
importance with the materiel development considerations of cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon everyone 
involved in the acquisition and logistics processes to ensure that system 
supportability is fully addressed throughout the development, acquisition 
fielding, and utilization of the system.  AR 700-127, Integrated Logistics 
Support, provides Army policy on supportability planning and execution.     
Effective supportability is integral to the success of a system.  To achieve 
a reliable and cost effective system, supportability must be under 
discussion and evaluation from the very inception of the system idea.  This 
requires materiel developers establish integrated working-level teams 
under their formal integrated product teams, to manage the supportability 
program.  Additionally, Supportability analyses must be conducted as an 
integral part of the systems engineering process.  This is to ensure 
supportability requirements are identified to optimize total system 
performance.  Preparation of the Supportability Strategy (see AR 700-127) 
as a source document for the integrated logistics support information 
requirements of our program management documentation must be 
recognized as only the beginning of our responsibility.  We have to get 
beyond the notion that we have addressed our supportability requirements 
by merely including words in a prepared document.  For example, once 
the supportability Strategy has been approved, you have all the 
information you need to satisfy the support concept requirements of the 
Acquisition Strategy.  Using the Supportability Strategy as a starting point, 
we must undertake the continuously refine and improve the supportability 
function.  (Hoeper, 2000) 
 
This policy could be used throughout the services, and if properly implemented 
will save operations and maintenance (O&M) dollars associated with a weapon system’s 
total ownership costs for years to come.  (Citation needed)  As stated, this policy 
currently exists at the Department of the Army level, and some of the Air Force’s 
subordinate agencies, but not at the service-wide policy level.   This policy is needed 
throughout DOD acquisition if we ever wish to identify and manage total ownership 
costs, and stop our standard business practice of cost overruns. 
 6
It is the objective of this thesis to apply change management theories and models 
to analyze what organizational changes will best support the implementation of the 
Army’s policy on making Supportability equal to Cost, Schedule, and Performance.  If 
implemented successfully, the policy has the potential to improve the acquisition 
products that our war fighters will use and save our limited defense dollars.  
Supportability must be considered as a major element of the system if the resultant 
product output is to be cost-effective and meet the needs of the customer/war fighter. The 
resultant acquisitions will better identify the total cost of ownership.    
 
D. HOW IS SUPPORTABILITY CO-EQUAL TO COST, SCHEDULE, AND 
PERFORMANCE?  
Supportability is the key overlooked factor in the acquisition process.  We can 
further acknowledge the importance of Supportability in the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition and Technology Honorable Jacques S. Gansler’s statement before the 
Subcommittees on Procurement and Research and Development House Committee on 
National Security, Acquisition & Technology Overview, February 26, 1998:  
From an acquisition perspective, to accomplish this [provide our 
services the needed weapons and technology to defend our nation and win 
wars], we must do three things. We must modernize our current weapons 
systems; develop and deploy the major new systems and subsystems 
required for 21st century operations; and support those systems efficiently, 
effectively, and securely -- and we must do all three of these at lower cost 
and with drastically reduced cycle times.   
 
Gansler states we must be able to support weapon systems efficiently and 
effectively at lower costs.  This is a significant testimony as to why Supportability must 
be equal to Cost, Schedule and Performance in all respects.  Supportability must be 
evaluated in program reviews in the same manner Cost, Schedule, and Performance are 
evaluated (Blanchard, 1998).  Supportability must be represented on teams with an equal 
voice to Cost, Schedule, and Performance.  Supportability must be looked at equally to 
Cost, Schedule, and Performance in all Acquisition Program Baseline documents; and the 
rewards structure for Program Managers as well as program members should reward 
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Supportability the same way the current reward system favors Cost, Schedule, and 
Performance (Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000).   
Much of the downstream cost is a consequence of design and 
management decisions made during the early stages of conceptual and 
preliminary design.  Thus, the supportability analysis is critical in system 
design and development, and the use of life cycle cost analysis methods is 
essential if one is to assess whether or not the system can be operated and 
supported in an effective and efficient manner.  (Blanchard, 1998) 
 
Supporting the systems is a critical logistics function needing as much emphasis and 
resources as efforts to monitor cost, track schedule, or increase performance.  
 
E. WHAT DOES THE DODI 5000.2, DOD 5000.2-R SAY ABOUT 
SUPPORTABILITY?  
The Department of Defense Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 provide mandatory 
procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs.  The two will be referred to from 
here on as the 5000 series.  The procedures listed in the 5000 series are required for all 
MDAPS and MAIS, but are also to be taken as a general model for other than MDAP or 
MAIS programs.  The 5000 series is a compilation of guidance from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), Circular A-11, and current statutes.   
The procedures listed in the 5000 series unequivocally require the Program 
Manager to address each of following: acquisition program goals, acquisition program 




The 5000 series requires every program to establish goals consistent with Cost, 
Schedule, and performance.  (1.1).  It specifically states: “The best time to reduce Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC) and program schedule is early in the acquisition process.  
Continuous price/cost/schedule/performance tradeoff analyses shall accomplish price/cost 
and schedule reductions.”  
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G. COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE TRADE OFFS. 
The Cost, Schedule and Performance Trade off section is a subchapter in the 
DOD 5000 series and focuses purely on cost, schedule and performance.  This portion of 
the regulation further discusses “trade space” and how cost, schedule, and performance 
may be traded between objective and threshold parameters without Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA).  The regulation specifically addresses cost and states, 
 Cost parameter shall identify TOC (broken-out into direct costs:  
research, development, test, and evaluation costs, procurement costs, 
military construction costs, operations and support costs to include 
environmental, safety, and occupational health compliance costs), and the 
costs of acquisition items procured with operations and maintenance 
funds… 
 
The costs associated with incorporating logistics and logistics testing in program 
development can be large up-front costs.  This makes them an easy trade off in the 
performance category.   
 
H. ACQUISITION STRATEGY. 
Part 2 of the 5000 series requires each Program Manager to develop and 
document an acquisition strategy to guide program execution from initiation through 
procurement of systems, subsystems, components, spares, and services beyond the initial 
production contract award and during post-production support. (DOD 5000.2-R, 2002).  
“A primary goal of the strategy shall be to minimize the time and cost it takes, consistent 
with common sense and sound business practices.”  The focus here is cost and schedule.  
Supportability is not even mentioned, yet it has been proved that the award cost for the 
system “now” is only 30% of the realized cost; up to 70% of the total cost is yet to be 
realized.  (Blanchard, 1998) 
 
I.  SUPPORT STRATEGY.  
Section 2.8 requires a support strategy and provides clear instructions for the 
Program Manager.  “As part of the acquisition strategy, the program manager shall 
develop and document a support strategy for life-cycle sustainment and continuous 
improvement of product affordability, reliability, and supportability, while sustaining 
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readiness.”  Knowing this raises the question, “Why do we still have programs failing in 
performance, supportability, and cost overruns?”   
 
J.  LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT OVERSIGHT.  
Section 2.8.6 requires the support strategy to address how the program manager 
and other responsible organizations will maintain the proper oversight over the fielded 
system.  The oversight is required to identify and properly address performance, 
readiness, ownership cost, and support issues.  The oversight shall include post 
deployment evaluation to support planning for assuring sustainment and implementing 
technology insertion for continuous improvement; however, once the program manager 
awards the contract, he or she is relieved by a new program manager and is no longer 
associated with the project.  Thus, the same program manager who was responsible for 
the system through its development does not maintain the life cycle oversight after 
program award. 
 
K.  SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT CONCEPTS.  
Program managers are required to conduct acquisition logistics management 
throughout the program life cycle in a cost effective manner.  They are required to 
conduct a supportability analysis to achieve cost-effective support throughout the system 
lifecycle.  The system’s total ownership cost is to play a key role in influencing the 
overall selection process.  Support concepts for all systems shall provide cost effective, 
total-life-cycle, logistics supportability.  (DOD 5000.2, 2000). 
 
L.  SUMMARY. 
What we desire is an acquisition system that promotes and rewards maximum 
reliability, sufficient budget for full funding (design to disposal), and an organizational 
structure that incorporates and addresses the need for effective and efficient 
Supportability and program performance. This thesis will identify specific organizational 
changes that must be addressed if our defense acquisition community is going to 
effectively implement Supportability.  We will address these fundamental organizational 
issues briefly from the policy level where rules and regulations are created, and in depth 
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at the implementation level within the program environment.  Our analysis will use 
organizational management and change management tools to understand the breakdown 
in Supportability, and methods of changing the current situation.  We will address 
implementation of the Army Supportability policy for DOD-wide use.  Our focus is on  
how get “there” from “here,” by framing these issues with organizational models and 
using a logistics lens to capture the successful blend of tools needed to successfully 
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  II.  THE BECKHARD AND HARRIS MODEL OF CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
A. THE BECKHARD AND HARRIS  MODEL. 
Many models for organizational change exist.  Some change models resemble 
strategic planning.  Some are tailored around specific functions, processes, or root causes 
symptomatic in many of today’s organizations.  The change model selected for this study 
is presented in Organizational Transitions, Managing Complex Change.  (Beckhard & 
Harris, 1997)   
In their book, Beckhard and Harris discuss pressures for change that commonly 
influence many organizations.  They also present guidelines for the effective 
implementation of change that can be applied by any particular organization facing the 
pressures of change.  The Beckhard and Harris model is a model that tries to represent 
real challenges to organizations in today’s world.   The authors discuss many of the 
factors experienced by leaders and managers of many organizations.  Beckhard and 
Harris present a simple model that can be applied to any organization, public or private 
during periods of changing conditions.  The model is actually presented as a map to direct 
leaders through the required changes.  The map then can be turned into a process outline 
for influencing action plans, execution, and desired outcomes.  The map begins with 
developing an understanding of the organizational internal and external situation and 
concludes with developing a plan that becomes strategic and tactical in nature, and assists 
managing the implementation of changes to improve chances of successful organizational 
change.  Figure 2 presents the model map of the Change Management Process presented 
by Beckhard and Harris.  This model will be discussed in detail for application in this 
study, and to present readers with a basic understanding of the diagnostic approach used 
to arrive at the conclusions and recommendations at the end of the study.   
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Definin g the de sired future  state
Wh y Change?
Determinin g the n eed for change
Determinin g the d egree of ch oice about wh ether to change
Describing the prese nt state
Get ting fr om h ere to there:
assessing th e pre sen t in terms of th e futu re to de termin e
the work  to be don e




Figure 2.  Map of the Change Management Process 
 
B. WHY CHANGE? 
Beckhard and Harris address organizational challenges involved with change and the 
dilemma of balancing change and stability.  These challenges include, but are not limited 
to, organizational downsizing, changes in ways of doing business, and changes in the 
culture of the organization.  These and other pressures on the organization provide the 
answer to the question, “why change?” which is the first stop on the map.  The map 
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begins by requiring leaders to understand why change occurs, understanding why 
organizations need to change, and the choices leaders have regarding changes.  More 
specifically the map requires leaders to look at the forces impacting their own 
organization and how those forces might provide a direction for change.       
The reasons for change can be identified from circumstances as direct as a new 
governing mandate, or regulatory changes handed down to an organization that requires 
change to occur; or forces for change may be indirect and slow developing.  Indirect 
influences can be identified through internal and external analyses of the organization, 
organizational SWOT (strength, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, or 
stakeholder analysis.  Regardless of the methods used, once the reasons for change are 
identified, leaders can begin to form or see the vision of what the organization is to look 
like following change.   The reasons for change do not necessarily depict what changes 
will take place within the organization, but rather what capabilities the organization must 
present or perform, and what operating conditions the organization must survive in.  
Properly identifying the reasons for change will direct the size of change, or the number 
of choices leaders may have about whether to change or not, and to what degree.   
The operating conditions driving the reasons for change, as well as the present 
state of areas, sections, departments, or parts of the organization considered for change, 
can define a set of constraints that shape leadership’s view of the desired future state.  
This is important to understand.  Leadership may plan desired changes to fit within the 
constraints and available resources.  If they can properly identify the constraints, the 
leadership will not be as likely to ask for something unattainable.   However, if “real” 
constraints are not identified, the leadership may create a vision of drastic change that 
cannot actually be obtained.  It is also possible that a change plan overly emphasizing 
constraints can be too conservative and end up with a sub-optimized solution.  If a largely 
unconstrained change plan is pursued it can dramatically change the organization and 
actually influence further change in the operating environment.  This less constrained 
approach can potentially lead to further continuous evolutionary change.   Understanding 
the real reasons for change, and the framework for understanding what those changes will 
look like, lead to the next two stops on the map: describing the present state and defining 
the desired future state.   
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C. DESCRIBING THE PRESENT STATE AND DEFINING THE DESIRED 
FUTURE STATE.  
In this model, the organization leadership is expected to recognize how the 
current organization improperly fits in the new operating conditions defined in the “why 
change?” block.  The next step in the process requires the ability to envision what the 
organization looks like in the future once change has occurred to create stability in the 
anticipated future environment.  The next two blocks on the map further this process by 
requiring leadership to describe the present state, and define the desired future state.   
Defining the present state can be done many ways.  The organization’s leadership 
may define the present state by statistical results found in financial reports, market shares, 
or other business performance measures.  In the past, organizations have defined their 
present state by conducting meetings or discussions with employees to identify their 
problems or challenges.  Previously mentioned SWOT assessments can be conducted to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing the organization 
that define the present state and the constraints facing the organization.  Figure 3 is 
adapted from Concepts of Strategic Management.  The diagram depicts what a usable 
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Operator/customer visibility and feedback Independent testing for operational suitability
Logistics support must be satisfied to proceed to next milestone Logistics Advocates
Weaknesses
Logistics inherently weak because the acquisition system does not reward fully funded logistics
Program managers are rewarded for lowest cost, meeting schedule, and maximizing performance
Logistics support programs lack unity of purpose, a central theme, and are rife with sub-optimal goals
Logistics share of general program resources is small    
 
Figure 3.  SWOT Assessment (After: David, 1997) 
 
While SWOT assessments were mentioned as a tool to identify “why change?” they can 
also assist in describing the future.  Once a SWOT assessment identifies the 
organization’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, the reasons for change 
become evident [to capitalize on opportunities and decrease vulnerabilities to threats] as 
well as the strengths and weaknesses that describe the condition of the organization at the 
present.  Following a successful SWOT analysis or other similar useful tools, an 
organization’s leadership can describe the present state and identify areas of opportunity 
as well as areas to avoid.  SWOT analysis can be accomplished by using any of several 
models dealing with organizational management theories such as the organizational 
systems model (Nadler & Tushman, 1980) which looks at organizations structure, 
culture, rewards, personnel, and technology to assess congruence within the workplace, 
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as well as actual outcomes and outputs relative to the inputs and desired outputs of the 
organizations leadership.    This model will be elaborated further in Chapter IV. 
 Defining the future state involves knowing what performance criteria are required 
for the organization and how the leadership sees the organization performing the required 
tasks to meet those measures.  This may require reestablishing core competencies or 
mission statements.  Scenario writing may become involved as leadership tries to picture 
what the new organization looks like, performs like, and requires of resources, 
technology, and personnel.    Figure 4 shows the Change Management Process (Beckhard 
and Harris, 1997) steps of describing the present state and defining the future state.  This 
time, the diagram includes considerations for leadership at all stops on the map.   
In the matter of describing the present state and defining the future state, the 
diagram has arrows pointing towards each other.  The arrows on the diagram pointing 
from one block to the other make the two interdependent upon each other.  The encircling 
arrows and middle loop leading to the next block downward on the map imply that 
continuous assessment must take place between the current organization and the desired 
future state depicted in the leadership’s vision.  This continuous assessment and feedback 
is critical to the successful transition from current to desired future state.  Upon 
identifying the reasons for change and the pressures for change, a manager may see 
hindrances in the current organization that lead to a partial definition of the desired future 
state.  This vision of the future would define how the organization would operate once the 
hindrance has been removed or the identified problem solved.     
Likewise, the leader may have a vision of the organizational end state, then 
overlay that onto the current organization structure and see the areas requiring change.  
An example of this would be in the United States’ efforts for National Missile Defense.  
A potential threat drives the President and supporters to obtain a National Missile 
Defense capability.  The National Defense System does not yet exist, but the end state 
vision is clear.  With the end state requirement clearly defined, defense leaders and 
defense industries begin working to find technical and tactical solutions to change 
America into a nation capable of protecting its assets from a ballistic missile attack.  
While America still does not know exactly what the path towards change looks like, 
changes are happening to reach the desired end state.     
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Finally, as you follow an actual circle around and around, the analysis of the 
differences between present state and desired future state may entail a series of “if-then” 
questioning, back and forth between the present and the future, that gradually shapes the 
areas and types of change the organizational leadership will pursue.   
Figure 4 shows the Change Management Process depicted by Beckhard and 
Harris with many of the considerations involved with describing the present state and 
defining the future state.   
 
D. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE.   
Once the desired future state is obtained and the required changes from the 
present state are identified, a plan for successful change must fall out from the middle of 
the two blocks, as is shown on the map.  This requires defined and usually quantifiable 
terms to measure the present state in terms of the future.  Figure 4 shows some of the 
areas Beckhard and Harris identified to influence the process of “getting from here to 
there.”   
 The “getting from here to there" block on the map will involve the majority of this 
study.  To provide guidance to change planning, specific organizational management 
theories and models will be applied.  These models include, for example: congruency 
(Nadler and Tushman,1980), expectancy theory (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 1998), and 
reward mechanisms (Kerr, 1995) .  Organizational processes (Garvin, 1998), structure, 
teaming (Forsber, et al, 2000) roles, responsibilities, and tasks can be analyzed for their 
part in the organization’s future state and the required changes to get members in the 
organization to effectively operate within the parameters of the future state.  This portion 
of the change management process must be carefully planned and thought through.  
Strategic and tactical planning in the “getting from here to there”stage will present a large 
indicator of successful or unsuccessful change implementation.    This plan must be 
detailed, measurable, and have a deliberate action plan that will be followed during the 





E. MANAGING DURING THE TRANSITION STATE.  
Management tasks during the transition state of the organization requires 
following the action plan devised in the previous stage, and identifying reactions or 
degrees of success or failure.  Assessment must be continuous to keep change occurring 
in the desired direction and results.  Upon identification of critical success criteria, the 
organization’s leadership must identify changes to meet those criteria.  A critical element 
in implementation is the development and use of measures that are aligned with criteria 
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III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
 
A. OVERVIEW.  
 
The Beckhard and Harris model, previously discussed, requires organizations to 
understand the external forces influencing change in our operating environments.  It also 
requires organizations facing change to describe the present state; and as closely as 
possible, define the desired future state.  All of these organizational analyses help to 
define why and where change is needed.  In this chapter, potential areas of opportunity 
will be identified for change to improve the Supportability policy implementation.  Upon 
identifying the target areas for change, further study will follow the Beckhard and Harris 
model and other relevant theories and models to analyze those identified areas and 
provide recommendations to assist the Supportability policy implementation.   
The Supportability policy drives defense acquisitions towards cost effectiveness.  
In addressing the issue of cost effectiveness, it has been argued that there is a lack of 
Total Cost Visibility.  This is illustrated by Blanchard’s “iceberg model” (1998), which 
depicts cost of development and manufacturing to be only the tip of the iceberg, while the 
rest of the lifecycle costs are hidden under the water and represent a much larger portion 
of the entire iceberg.  For many systems, the costs associated with design and 
development and initial procurement are well known.  We make decisions on the cost of 
these items on a regular basis.  However, the costs associated with support of the system 
throughout its planned life cycle are hidden.  In the past decade, systems have been 
modified to include the “latest and greatest technology” due to pressures from Congress, 
GAO, and Acquisition reform.  The downstream cost impacts are losing visibility.  These 
“hidden costs” of operation and maintenance (supportability) are as high as 75% of the 
total life cycle costs (Blanchard, 1998).   
To better understand the scope of the problem surrounding the implementation of 
the Supportability policy, we researched past Congressional transcripts, Government 
Accounting Office studies, and conducted interviews with both military and civilian 
personnel within prominent materiel, systems, and operational commands in the field.  
During the interview, we introduced the fact that the Army has promulgated a new 
Defense Acquisition policy mandating that Supportability Co-Equal with Cost Schedule, 
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and Performance, and asked the question: What are the problem areas/barriers to 
accomplish the policy?  Of all people interviewed, we chose the responses from five of 
the twenty-five individuals that targeted specific barriers applicable to change 
management theory.  Archived reviews and interviews that highlight specific areas that 
require change planning follow below.  The subsequent chapter will further develop these 
topics and illustrate the application of relevant theories and models to change planning 
that can facilitate the accomplishment of policy.        
 
B. EVIDENCE OF A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEED FOR THE 
SUPPORTABILITY POLICY. 
The Department of the Army realized the need for changes to produce more cost- 
effective acquisitions when they created the Supportability policy.  However, the 
problems leading up to the creation of the Supportability policy are not unique to the 
Army.  Mr. E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics) testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
April 26, 2001.  He identified two key priorities:    
 
• To Achieve Credibility and Efficiency in the Acquisition and Logistics 
Support Process.” He stated, “Too many cost overruns, schedule slippage, 
and performance failures have deteriorated our credibility…    
 
• To Revitalize the Quality and Morale of the Acquisition Workforce.  
The morale of our acquisition workforce, military and civilian, is low; 
some of our best people are leaving and we cannot recruit good people as 
replacements in the numbers we need.  The average age of the workforce 
is growing and 50% of them will be eligible for retirement in the next four 
years.  We need to let this workforce know how valuable they are and how 
much they are appreciated.  
 
The first goal stated by Aldridge alludes to two areas for concern.  The first goal 
mentioned cost overruns and the credibility of the defense acquisition community.  
Avoiding cost overruns while providing our military with reliable weapons is precisely 
the intent of the Supportability policy.  Understanding the conditions that have led to cost 
overruns in the past will be a critical step in understanding conditions required to 
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successfully implement the Supportability policy.  This policy reflects the cause and 
effect relationship between supportability and post-production cost over runs.  We have 
historically committed larger portions of our defense budgets to sustain systems with 
poor Supportability factors.     
The fact that Aldridge believes credibility deteriorated, suggests a gradual decline 
in trust over time.  How is credibility deteriorated?  One possible explanation is the 
history of programs that have been sold to Congress as something DOD needs and would 
only cost a certain amount; and then in later years were found to be much more costly, 
and questionable in performance.  Over time that historical performance impacts the 
culture inside and outside the acquisition community.  Therefore, Mr. Aldridge’s goals 
point out the need for change in the Department of Defense acquisition communities, and 
address reasons for cost overruns, and declining credibility.   
The second goal described a need to “revitalize” the acquisition workforce, and 
improve the overall morale in order to stop the loss of employees currently experienced 
by our acquisition communities.  Revitalization has many smaller issues worth 
discussing.  What does Aldridge mean by “revitalizing?”  What caused the workforce to 
become discouraged to the point that morale declined and workers started leaving, with 
no new or young workers entering the system?  When something needs to be revitalized 
it generally means it needs new life, energy, or new inputs to continue actions.  The need 
for revitalizing suggests the current workforce is simply spent, or worn out and has little 
left to provide any new energy.  This could be caused by cultural degradation, lack of 
congruency [how well components fit together] (Nadler & Tushman, 1980), insufficient 
compensation (Kerr, 1985), or inefficient work processes (Garvin, 1998) that simply 
waste so much of people’s time and energy that the current workers simply stop trying to 
improve the system.   
If Aldridge’s testimony is accurate, then the successful implementation of new 
policy will require the support of a revitalized workforce and efficient programs that 
prevent cost overruns and gain credibility of our acquisition community.  Without 
addressing Aldridge’s stated problems, the organization will have little chance of 
revitalizing and will have low probability for gaining credibility.     
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C. OTHER VIEWS IDENTIFYING NEEDS FOR CHANGE. 
Additional issues requiring change were identified through interviewing twenty-
five people throughout DOD (three major systems commands, one operational command, 
and one maintenance command) in pay-grade levels ranging from O-5 and O-6, and GS-
14.  Interviews conducted telephonically lasted approximately 30 minutes in length.  
Other interview information came back in the form of electronic mail.  In interviewing 
managers at different levels, we asked what they saw as major trends or obstacles 
affecting supportability and the possibility of successfully implementing the 
Supportability policy.   
A military grade O-6 comptroller from one of the DOD’s major systems 
commands responsible for the oversight and funding of acquisition programs stated the 
following:  
There is zero to negative government commitment [to acquisition 
programs].  PMs will do anything to get their foot in the funding door [a 
camel nose] to get agencies, and congress to invest in it.  Once the system 
has had enough investment, there is no turning back because you have 
invested too much money to turn back on it now. 
 
From personal experience he believed that if the appropriations committees knew 
of the total cost picture from the onset of the program, that it would never get off the 
ground.  Additionally, he discussed rewards and incentives for the PM.  He said that once 
a program has been officially approved, that the incentive for the PM is the timely award 
of a cost conscious system [cost, schedule, performance].  He said that there is no 
incentive for the PM to be efficient.  There is no monetary incentive or profit similar to 
that given in the private sector.    
 Discussing later implications he stated, “Then the system is fielded and all hidden 
costs of support become visible.  The systems now eat into our operating funds at the cost 
of other programs.  The logistics or supply support folks field the blame for supporting a 
system that was doomed from the beginning.  The logistician becomes the fall guy.”  He 
went on to say that this has become an accepted practice, which can reflect upon the 
culture and context inside and outside the organization.   
 The above statements from the systems command comptroller depict a live 
animated, out-of-control situation, referring to the nature of the beast and eating out of 
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operating funds.  The continuing problems seem so significant that they have taken on 
animal like characteristics of monstrous proportions.  Nevertheless, these problems can 
be dissected to identify smaller contributing problems with potential solutions.  Like 
Aldridge’s statement, the comptroller mentioned cost overruns.  According to the O-6, 
the program manager had two major functions: develop the program appropriated by 
Congress or other subordinate approving authorities, and get it delivered to the war 
fighters.  Once delivered, the PM moves onto the next acquisition program.  It is after the 
time of delivery and during the postproduction phase of support [supportability function] 
where the majority of the costs actually become known.  These modifications are 
extremely costly.  
When we asked the comptroller how we could demonstrate the significance of 
cost differences that surface from the delivery through fielding of the system, he said: 
 Every system has a mandatory acquisition review from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  If you were to pull up any program 
review and look at the cost of the project now as to what was forecasted 6 
years ago, I bet you will find a much larger and significant total project 
cost than what was predicted.   
 
 Adding to the argument, an O-5 select, Maintenance Officer from an Aviation 
Squadron stated,  
The system has created a short term focus.  There is no long-term 
total program focus.  The PM is rewarded or evaluated for cost [at 
delivery] and measures of cost, but should be evaluated for total cost.  
Total cost…the life cycle cost.  We spend too much time evaluating the 
current cost and not the TOTAL cost created through the support phase.  
    
Understanding how to change or reverse this patterned chain of events would be a 
significant step in improving the chances for implementing the Supportability policy.  
The comptroller’s comments suggest that we have a culture and reward system that 
promotes a short-term focus and a lack of accountability for long-term outcomes.  If the 
Program Manager continues to be rewarded only for program award and delivery then 
there is no reward incentive for the quality of the product or success of the program in 
following years.  Therefore these interviews suggest there are inadequate control systems 
or rewards for treating Supportability with the same emphasis as initial stated cost or 
schedule.  Even the realized cost at time of delivery, which is likely to exceed the initial 
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stated cost, is going to be less if Supportability is left undisclosed, and therefore will be 
favored by Program Managers that are being rewarded for cost at delivery.  Once again, 
as the comptroller stated, after the system is delivered, “the logistician is the fall guy.”   
 
D. TRADE-OFFS SEEN AS A MEANS TO OBTAINING RESULTS WITHIN 
CONSTRAINTS.  
An O-5 at one of the systems commands gave further insights as to some of the 
acquisition problems that have to change for the Supportability policy to be successful.   
Trade offs.  The biggest trend I notice…would be the elements of 
logistics that are traded off… Because of the fiscal constraints placed on 
the development, trade offs in logistic elements become a reality.  If you 
do not have enough to buy the number needed you trade or make 
concessions in order to achieve those performance specifications required 
for delivery.   
 
This statement suggest that costs identified to improve reliability or reduce failure 
rates are avoided to keep more money available for other performance specifications like 
speed, accuracy, lethality, and other advanced technical capabilities. It is possible that 
Program Managers would address Supportability if they had enough time and money to 
finance the costs associated with reliability tests and evaluation, logistics support analysis 
and logistics support plans that are additional costs to the program during the 
development phases.  An O-3, F-18 Aviator from a Strike Squadron added from the field,  
Money from an operator’s perspective always sounds like it would 
fix anything.  But the fact of the matter is that…we are using operating 
dollars to pay for the mistakes made at the acquisition table.  We just don’t 
have enough, or often not enough of the right color of money to keep 
operations and maintenance going. 
 
This aviator provides a picture of the outcomes associated with trade offs due to 
financial constraints.  In this situation finances and budget control are a significant 
resource constraint to the Program Manager that must be addressed for Supportability to 





E. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTATION. 
One O-5 financial officer mentioned an issue created by the structure of our 
systems command matrix organizations: 
 The logistician on the Integrated Product Team (IPT) works for 
his functional department [sometimes called competencies] and works for 
the Program Manager.  The logistician, as a member of the IPT, works for 
the Program Manager but has a performance evaluation written by the 
department or competency head.  The Program Manager provides input 
for the evaluation. 
 
 This creates a situation where may be in the logistician’s best interest is to 
appease the Program Manager, who is providing the input to the logistician’s 
performance evaluation.  The weapon system may have significant problems from a 
logistics perspective.  However, the logistician on the team may not raise the issue if 
addressing the issue is going to cost the program money and time, and put the logistician 
in an unfavorable situation with the program manager who has already conceded to 
logistical support trade offs, and is now trying to get the weapon system delivered.  This 
provides visibility on a potential organizational structure problem that may be an obstacle 
to the Supportability policy.    
 
F. CULTURAL AND POWER CONFLICTS.    
Lastly, in addressing the membership on the IPT, the O-5 financial officer 
suggested a cultural or power base problem might exist.  “If a logistician is not an 
engineer or has little time in the organization, they will not be heard.  Experience 
[recognized as time spent in the organization] is listened to…The [IPT] members from 
these functional departments that make up the [IPT] team have usually been around a 
long time.”  The statement leaves uncertainty to whether the logisticians are faced with a 
situation where they have little experience to bring to the system, or whether there are 
political forces used to keep the logisticians quiet while other aims are met.  The O-5 
(select) from the Aviation Squadron added, “The Competencies are rightly named 
because they are your power base.  They [the senior department or competencies] have 
the most experience and knowledge.”  The previous quote refers to the existence of an 
informal organization or an informal leader with perceived expert, legitimate, and even 
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referent power that exceeds that of the Program Manager or the Supportability lead.  
Thus, attention must be paid to informal sources of power and how that may influence 
appropriate attention to supportability.   
       
G. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND A CHAMPION TO SPEAK OUT.  
Two additional issues that were briefly mentioned in the interviews were 
communication and the turn-over rate of program managers.  The main idea behind the 
two was that Supportability would not be successful until someone with a significant 
power base and longevity in a position of power properly communicates the need for it.  
The turnover factor of the program managers and the roles and responsibilities of a 
program manager suggests that the champion must be someone other than program 
managers. A champion should be someone at the policy level that can communicate the 
problem and direction, as well as influence the activities of subordinate agencies.     
While Aldridge identified a need for the defense acquisition community to 
improve its credibility, the interviewed O-5s identified a need for logisticians to improve 
their credibility within the acquisition community itself.  This has to be addressed in a 
manner that improves the position of the logisticians assigned to IPTs, and does so 
without making others feel threatened.  The interviewees also identified the need for a 
Supportability champion to carry the issue to the stakeholders that provide the resources.  
This champion has to be able to communicate the needs in a manner that obtains 
resources but does not threaten the current champions driving technical capabilities.   
Referring back to Figure 3 in Chapter II, management of the transition state is the 
last major component to Beckhard and Harris’ change management model.  With the 
same regard for Supportability, there needs to be a deeper understanding of the issues to 
be resolved in the policy action/implementation plan.  The identified issues that present 
potential obstacles to successfully implementing the Supportability if adopted throughout 
the Department of Defense are: 
 
1) Obtaining organizational balance and effectiveness within resource constraints  
2) Rewards and incentives facing program managers 
3) Organizational structure of systems commands 
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4) Power bases  
5) Effective communication in change management 
6) How to measure Supportability policy effectiveness and create accountability 
7)  A Supportability champion  
8) Motivation and morale of the acquisition workforce 
9) Credibility of acquisition members with the community and its stakeholders 

























































IV.  ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED PROBLEM AREAS AND 
POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION 
 
The previous chapter concluded with a listing of identified areas posing 
impediments to effective Supportability policy implementation.  In this chapter we will 
apply various management theories to these issues in order to provide guidance for 
change action planning.  Incorporating these considerations into the Beckhard and Harris 
model will assist in identifying how the organization “gets there from here.”  Following 
theory application, we will present courses of action to consider as possibilities for 
change that can improve our defense acquisition community and the chance for effective 
implementation of the Supportability policy throughout DOD.  The identified issues 
presented again are the following:   
1) Obtaining organizational balance and effectiveness within resource constraints 
2) Rewards and incentives facing program managers 
3) Organizational structure of systems commands 
4) Power bases  
5) Effective communication in change management 
6) How to measure Supportability policy effectiveness and create accountability 
7) A Supportability champion  
8) Motivation and morale of the acquisition workforce 
9) Credibility of acquisition members with the community and its stakeholders 
10) Culture  
Issues 8, 9, and 10 will be addressed at the end of the chapter as they are influenced by, 
and often a result from the seven preceding issues.   
 
A. OBTAINING ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
WITHIN RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS.   
As organizations identify constraints that provide the boundaries they cannot go 
beyond, how well the organization optimizes performance within those constraints 
determines success.  Some of the quotes provided in Chapter III suggest that simply 
throwing more money at programs will make them all successful.  With more money 
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programs could afford more labor, more testing, more research, and the list would 
probably continue.  The harshness of reality is that the financial resources are limited in 
amount, method of obtainment, and method of spending.  Congress passes down these 
constraints.  Congress is not likely to change due to a program level organization request.  
Program managers can send their input and requests for budget resources, but once the 
dollars are allocated, there is little else the program can do, but work within those 
resource constraints.  In this situation, the successful program and program manager will 
figure out how to find success within the given resources and constraints.   
 Analyzing the organization for congruency or fit can identify much of the 
indicators of success.  Nadler and Tushman present a Congruency model that assists in 
analyzing organizational “fit” or congruence.   
The basic hypothesis of the model, which builds on this total state 
of congruence, is as follows:  Other things being equal, the greater the 
total degree of congruence or fit between the various components, the 
more effective will be the organization--effectiveness being defined as the 
degree to which actual organization outputs at individual, group, and 
organizational levels are similar to expected outputs, as specified by 
strategy.  (Nadler & Tushman, 1980)   
 
Figure 5 represents the model taken from Nadler and Tushman and presents a 
visual picture of the interaction among the elements of the organizational systems model.  
The congruency model and hypothesis dictate that there must be appropriate fit between 
the blocks where the arrows connect them.  The organization will succeed to the degree 
there is acceptable balance and fit between organization elements represented by the 
blocks.  The problem analysis steps to identify and resolve “incongruencies” within this 
model are the following: identify symptoms, specify inputs, identify outputs, identify 
problems, describe relevant components of the organization, assess the congruence and 



























While all steps are required to successfully apply this model, assessing the Congruence or 
various fits among system elements, which makes the congruency theory meaningful.  
Nadler and Tushman provide the following relationships requiring fit for organization 
success: 
 1) Individual/Organization.  How are individual needs met by the organizational 
arrangements?  Do individuals hold clear or distorted perceptions of organizational 
structures?  Is there a convergence of individual and organizational goals?  The measure 
of fit here can apply to the extent to which: individual needs or career interests are being 
satisfied by the organization; the organization is getting the desired work performed by 
the employed individuals; or the individual filling positions of increasing importance to 
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the organization in terms of values and needs of the organization that go beyond physical 
tasks.   
 2) Individual/Task.  How are individual needs met by the tasks?  Do individuals 
have skills and abilities to meet task demands?  Simply described, is there too much work 
to be done for the number of personnel available?  If there is, the individuals might 
become depressed, dissatisfied, or overly stressed possibly leading to further problems 
for both the organization and the individuals working in the organization.   
 3) Individual/Informal organization.  How are individual needs met by the 
informal organization?  How does the informal organization make use of individual 
resources consistent with informal goals?  Are the values of the individual aligned with 
the values, norms, and culture represented by the informal organization?   
 4) Task/Organization.  Are organizational arrangements (i.e., structure) adequate 
to meet the demands of the task?  Do organizational arrangements motivate behavior 
that’s consistent with tasks demands?  The task to organization fit is similar to the 
individual to task fit, except it now looks at the jobs required, work technology, and the 
entire organization’s ability to succeed.   
 5) Task/Informal organization.  Does the informal organization (i.e., norms and 
values) facilitate task performance?  Does it hinder or help meet the demands of the task? 
 6) Organization/Informal Organization.  Are the goals, rewards, and structures of 
the informal organization consistent with those of the formal organization?   
 Now looking at the model and understanding the six areas of fit presented, a 
comparison to defense acquisition programs can be made.  Visualizing Project 
Management, (Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman, 2000)) states the following six reasons 
for program failure, or performing below customer expectations.  Each of these six 
illustrates aspects of system incongruity or “misfit.”  The statement(s) in the following 
list are quoted from Visualizing Project Management.   
1)  “Since projects and project teams are temporary, their performance may 
be incorrectly attributed to the luck of the draw.”  This is an imbalance 
between the program Task and Formal Organization arrangements or 
structure.  There is an assumption in this quote, that the shortness of time a 
program team remains the same is so small, that luck rather than good 
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leadership, management, and performance by program members determine 
success.  With this assumption being a prevailing reason Forsberg, Mooz, and 
Cotterman identify for program failure, there seems to be a belief between 
program members and possibly managers as well, that regardless of leadership 
or management, or their individual and collective performance, program 
success will be determined by mere luck.  The relationship between the tasks 
involved in programs and the formal organization structure that results in 
temporary program participation creates the misfit.  The misfit results in the 
luck perception, which can lead to possible deviation from deliberate, strategic 
and sound program management.  When people begin to believe that luck and 
not effort determines their success, then effort will decline and a sense of 
gaming or gambling against undetermined odds will become the prevalent 
practice.     
2) “Failure often results from fundamental confusion over precisely what is 
involved in managing a project successfully from inception through 
completion.  Even experienced managers often disagree on important 
aspects.”  This is an imbalance between the Individual and the Tasks, as well 
as the Individual and the Organization.  In this case of incongruence, the 
individual responsible for leading the program does not understand, or 
possibly cannot see, all of the needed tasks for program success.  Therefore 
there is an imbalance between the program manager (individual) and the 
management decisions and tasks required.  Additionally, the organization in 
this case, does not provide the individuals with enough tools or support 
structure to manage or identify those decisions and tasks required for program 
success, resulting in an imbalance between the program manager and what the 
formal organization expects of him or her.      
3) “Many projects fail by repeating either the technical or business mistakes of 
others, which we refer to as Lessons Learned.”  This could be an imbalance 
between Task and Organization, Task and Informal Organization, or both.  
This reason for failure could also be a failure of feedback from outputs into 
necessary adjustments in transformation processes of the system.  This 
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“misfit” occurs when organizations repeat the mistakes already experienced 
by programs or teams in the past.  When there is no means to capture the 
experiences and results, new members may repeat them simply by performing 
their functions in the same manner and intention that resulted in the previous 
mistakes.  Members of organizations have different experiences and if the 
members could share or pass on wisdom, the repeating of previous mistakes 
could be prevented.  In this case, the organization should have a lessons 
learned repository of information or some method of knowledge management 
that allows managers and leaders to look at past successes or failures before 
performing a related task.  Likewise, while knowledge management systems 
are a formal means to document past experiences and results, the informal 
organization can have a great deal to contribute to passing on lessons learned.  
The informal organization is the area where social groups develop, bond, and 
thereby pass on experiences simply through casual discussion after work or at 
lunch.  Military Warrant Officers are an excellent example of a group of 
technical officers in various positions that come together to mentor the new 
officers and share information to promote the overall success of the Warrant 
Officer Corps.  While they may not be on the same team, they informally 
work together as a professional group to promote the success of their 
profession as well as the formal organizations to which they are assigned.  
This type of sharing learned experiences pays off in shortening the length of 
time it takes to train managers and leaders, and decreases the probability of 
mistakes reoccurring by different members of the organization.   
4) “Plans don’t scale by demanding more and more from less and less.”  This is 
an imbalance of nearly all six fit categories.  This failure refers to the situation 
defense and corporate managers have found themselves in for years due to 
downsizing and budget reductions; doing more with less.  The authors of 
Visualizing Project Management acknowledge this point as a reason for 
failure simply because leaders intentions are rarely to do less, even though 
they may have less people and resources.  The imbalance occurs when 
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required tasks lack the needed personnel or resources, and when individuals 
are faced with the task, but insufficient support from the organization.    
5) “Inadequate skills.”  This failure is seen when individuals are incapable, 
unqualified, or untrained to perform a required task. 
6) “The trends toward specialists, each with their own language, coupled with 
the temporary aspects of projects, necessitate the definition of a common 
vocabulary for each project.”   Visualizing Project Management views project 
teams made up of individuals from different functional areas (e.g., 
engineering, computer software programming, finance, logistics).  These 
functional differences can cause incongruity.  Looking at Figure 5, the 
transformation process can breakdown between individuals, the informal 
organization, and the formal organization when trying to understand and 
perform tasks without a common vocabulary.      
The authors of Visualizing Project Management, when presenting the six frequent 
reasons for project failure referred to the end state of the project performing below 
customer expectations.  The customer expectations must be viewed as an outcome, and 
meeting the expectations should be a planned desired outcome.  Nadler and Tushman 
argue that without fit and balance in the organization those six reasons for project failure, 
linked to the six imbalances in the congruency model, can be expected.   Performing 
below customer expectations is exactly what the Supportability policy aims to improve.  
The customer expects the delivered system to perform when needed, as anticipated.  
Referring back to Aldridge’s testimony, eliminating cost overruns in acquisition was part 
of his goals as Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  The 
Supportability policy is directed to lower Total Ownership Costs and deliver the 
customers (i.e., both the taxpayers financing national defense and the war fighters 
defining the need in acquisitions) a reliable product that does not exceed planned costs.  
Obtaining balance within our acquisition community and our acquisition programs, based 
off the findings in Visualizing Project Management, will be an essential step for success. 
The presence of organizational imbalance can be found in a variety of ways.  
Nadler and Tushman above presented six.  These areas of misfit can be found in DOD 
acquisition organizations as well.  Imagine a program team that is overburdened with 
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Friday afternoon requests from higher headquarters to respond to a cut in their budget.  
They are expected to have the detailed response in by Monday morning start of business, 
and workers end up spending their weekends in the office to prepare the rebuttal report.  
Organizational imbalances as previously described can be identified quickly.  The Friday 
afternoon mark inquiry arrives in the form of a negative incentive.  The incentive to 
prepare the report is: do it, or lose the money in the budget.  The individuals preparing 
the report, if successful might be praised afterward, but the negative effect on the 
individuals required abort their weekend plans may be unsalvageable.  The individual(s) 
spending the weekend working on the report probably become rather dissatisfied with the 
organization and the tasks required of them.  The informal organization could start to 
work against the formal organization, and the formal organization may react adversely to 
the task and the higher formal organization providing the adverse conditions.  This is one 
example of how imbalances appear in an organization.  The successful leader and 
manager will find ways to keep the organization in balance.  Rewards and incentives can 
play a large role in balance.  Technological support can help balance if it makes tasks 
simpler to perform.  Maintaining the needed amount of people with the proper skills is 
another way to maintain balance.  The organizational structure may need changing to 
obtain balance.  Lastly, anything that can be done to manage or control the pressures 
placed on the organization by the external environment can significantly help in keeping 
balance.   
Obtaining balance in projects and programs in these areas of identified 
imbalances does not require exceeding the limits of resource constraints.  Obtaining 
balance will require using the steps presented by the model to understand where the 
imbalances lie, and then deciding how to communicate effectively and structure the 
organization to obtain balance and the desired outcomes and accomplishments that will 
make programs more successful, and also set each program up for success with respect to 
Supportability.  Attaining congruency within the organization will minimize the six 
common reasons for program failure and simultaneously work in the compliance with the 
Supportability policy thereby facilitating implementation.  
The imbalances that degrade congruency may vary from one organization to the 
next.  However, any leader can use the congruency model to analyze their own 
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organization’s levels of congruency.  The following subchapters present areas that can 
influence effective policy implementation in their own right, but also can be seen as a 
part of the congruency model and assessed for balance in the six areas of fit.  
 
B. REWARDS AND INCENTIVES FACING PROGRAM MANAGERS. 
The typical reward or incentive for a Program Manager who does well (i.e. 
achieving cost, schedule, and performance) is a follow-on assignment as a Program 
Manager of a larger program or a similar elevation in career status to the public or 
commercial sector.  While a Program Manager works for the government, there are no 
large bonuses or profit sharing financial rewards.  The incentive provided by the 
organization is increased power or status by position within the organization.   
 If the government desires to minimize cost overruns experienced in systems’ 
Total Ownership Costs, then there must be a reward mechanism change that rewards 
something other than delivery to the war fighter.  Cost overrun avoidance is achieved by 
increased reliability, maintainability, and availability. (Blanchard, 1998)  The 
Supportability policy says we desire Program Managers to value and respect 
Supportability and we must be cost conscious while serving the needs of the war fighters.   
Therefore the reward system needs to reward Supportability and reliability 
simultaneously and equally to technical performance or rapid delivery.   
 Causes for potential reward system ineffectiveness range from the following 
possibilities (Kerr, 1995):   
1) Fascination with Objective Criteria 
2) Overemphasis on Highly Visible Behaviors 
3) Hypocrisy  
Fascination with objective criteria occurs from management seeking to establish simple, 
quantifiable standards to base performance and rewards.  The simple, obvious, and 
understandable goals can lead to undesirable performance or goal displacement in areas 
of the organization (Kerr, 1995).  If the Program Manager’s reward system revolves 
around delivery of the system, an overarching goal for everyone might be to support the 
Program Manager’s decided delivery date.  Schedule is simple and easy to measure but 
does not capture the full range of factors for which the Program Manager is responsible.  
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An over-emphasis on the objectivity of schedule measures could lead to short cuts in 
design, functional analysis, logistics supportability analysis, and logistics test and 
evaluation.  An incentive system that rewards schedule over other factors (i.e. cost, 
performance, reliability) can make the timeline more important than those other factors 
because that is where the reward and focus is.  Once a delivery date is planned and set, 
subordinate activities can plan their work and synchronize their schedules.  This schedule 
orientation, created by such a reward system, can lead to a rigid program schedule that 
makes changes difficult.  Any unplanned delays, problems or identified shortcomings, 
may be left unreported or unresolved so as to not delay delivery.     
An overemphasis on highly visible behaviors is Kerr’s (1995) second potential for 
reward system failure.  This occurs when the rewarded activities are the obvious actions, 
while other contributing activities are difficult to observe or go unseen altogether.  This 
reward breakdown is also demonstrated when recognition and reward is given to a few 
individuals when an entire team truly is responsible for the rewarded performance.  Kerr 
refers to examples in sports where individual statistics become individual’s reward 
mechanism rather than the team’s win-loss record.  Starting quarterbacks on professional 
football teams receive the largest dollar contracts even though they could do nothing 
without their offensive linemen.  This is because the touchdown passes they throw are 
much more visible than the blocking and pass protection the linemen provide.   
In DOD this can occur from an overemphasis on current technical performance.  
Such a focus may presume an expectation of inherent long-term reliability, which is, by 
nature, difficult to observe.  In general, Supportability factors are much more uncertain 
and hard to measure.  The actual reliability of a component, ability for an assigned unit 
mechanic to repair, or the availability of repair parts throughout the life of a weapon 
system may remain unknown until long after the rewards and evaluations are due.  
Supportability is much more difficult to measure in the early years of a program, while 
more visible factors of cost, schedule, and performance become easy targets for building 
a reward structure around.  The easy targets are likely to become the criteria for basing 
rewards and incentives; however, ease of measurement is one of the reward system 
pitfalls Kerr argues to avoid. (Kerr, 1995)  A second reason for an over-emphasis on the 
highly visible factors is the emphasis on technical performance given by Acquisition 
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Reform.  “The mantra for project management 2000 has become ‘better, faster, 
cheaper.’” (Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000)  The 2001 Defense Quadrennial Review 
states, “The [Defense] Department will vigorously pursue the development and 
exploitation of technologies.”  Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review of 
1993 stated,  
 Acquisition reform shares a common border with many of our 
most important goals:  saving the taxpayer money; reinventing 
Government; strengthening our military; and improving our economy.  To 
meet these goals in today’s environment DOD must be able to rapidly 
acquire commercial and other state-of-the-art products and technology, 
from reliable suppliers who utilize the latest manufacturing and 
management techniques. 
 
Defense Secretary Perry’s Acquisition Reform mandate for change stated, 
“Rapidly acquire commercial products and technology from suppliers that utilize ‘cutting 
edge’ manufacturing techniques and ‘best practices’ in management.”  (Perry, 1994)  The 
previous quotes created an appetite for new technology.  The desire for rapid acquisition 
of the newest technologies can lead to a reward system that overlooks the Supportability 
issues behind the new technologies.   
Hypocrisy is the third potential source of failure cited by Kerr (1995).  Hypocrisy 
is evident when we state what we want, but then reward different behavior.  
Hypothetically, suppose that the Army is critically short Captains and wants to retain 
Captains.  And suppose the Army is aware that financial compensation is an issue in 
Captain retention due to job opportunities presented in a strong national economy.  If the 
Army decides mid-year pay raises are in order to retain officers, and then sends the 
majority of the pay raises to Lieutenant Colonels with an average of 17.5 years of service 
(20 years needed to retirement), then the reward system is rewarding the Lieutenant 
Colonels who are already inclined to remain in the service to reach their 20 year 
retirement option, and not the Captains who are leaving in droves.  This would be an 
example of hypocrisy in the reward system.   
 A similar analogy can be made to DOD acquisition community.  If the DOD 
wants to avoid cost overruns, it should not be as concerned with pushing the present 
boundaries of technology in pursuit of newer capabilities at the expense of logistics 
support.  If the services want to avoid cost overruns as stated by Mr. Aldridge, Under 
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Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, then programs are going to 
have to weigh the benefit of newer unproven technological advancements against proven 
and reliable older technologies.  Balance is needed between mission needs, technical 
performance, inherent reliability and supportability costs; and the acquisition community 
reward system should reflect that desire for balance.   
The program manager is going to reward subordinate performance that 
contributes to the program manager’s definition of success, which in turn is defined by 
the perception of what he/she will be rewarded for.  The temptation to become fascinated 
with easy to see and understand criteria such as cost at delivery, delivery date, or 
performance indicators such as speed, can cause members to perform in ways that will be 
narrowly focus on those goals or measures, at the detriment in the long run to overall 
effects.  Overemphasis on highly visible behaviors discourages members with indirect 
supporting activities to strive to do their best.  Hypocrisy will further discourage behavior 
and undermine confidence in the entire organization.  The Supportability policy is likely 
to be unsuccessful if the rewards and incentives for programs and program managers are 
not changed to support the policy.  
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMS COMMANDS. 
Organization structure is a large factor contributing to the culture and congruency 
of organizations.  “An organization’s structure is a relatively stable network of 
interdependencies among the people and tasks that make up the organization.”  (Wagner 
and Hollenbeck, 1998)  An organization will succeed operating in a particular structure to 
the extent structure fits with other factors contributing to organizational congruence.  In 
addressing implementation of the Supportability policy, organizational structure needs 
assessment for proper processes that make the structure work successfully with the rest of 
the organizational factors (i.e., technology, people, tasks, reward structure).  The structure 
of an organization determines how work will be handled and what processes are required 
for success.  Three organizational structures that relate to the services’ material and 
systems commands are functional, work flow group, and matrix.  Three processes 
imperative to the success of each structure are coordination processes, integration 
processes, and political processes.   
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 In looking generically at the organizational structure of our services’ materiel and 
systems commands, we typically find functional organizational designs.  Functional 
organizations are those that are grouped based on similarity of tasks, responsibilities, or 
functions.  Functional work groups help integrate and coordinate employees who perform 
similar tasks.  This sort of cooperation can greatly enhance productivity and allow the 
organization to take advantage of other cost savings. (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998)  
The negative side of functional organizations is that functional grouping separates people 
who are performing different tasks along the same flow of work. (Wagner and 
Hollenbeck, 1998)   
 “Many organizations are functional and hierarchical; they suffer from isolated 
departments, poor coordination, and limited lateral communication.  All too often, work 
is fragmented and compartmentalized, and managers find it difficult to get things done.” 
(Garvin, 1998)  Functional organizations rely on coordination processes due to the 
separate and alignment of workers along tasks.  The separation of functions creates a 
natural disconnect between unrelated tasks, that ultimately need to come together on the 
end product.   
Coordination processes integrate disorderly actions to produce a desired result.  
Typically large organizations accomplish coordination efforts by mutual adjustment, 
direct supervision, and standardization in the workforce.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998)  
Mutual adjustment occurs when members of the organization occupy similar levels of 
responsibility and they share information through professional discussions [interpersonal 
relations].  Direct supervision requires a responsible individual to determine what needs 
to be coordinated with other functions.  This is applicable in the example of a project 
coordinator who is chartered as a representative of the project manager, and proactively 
ensures future events will occur as planned.  Standardization provides workers stable 
conditions and procedures to follow in performing their tasks.  Standard operating 
procedures prevalent in military organizations are an example of standardization 
coordination efforts.   
    As commands follow functional structural lines, the implementation of the 
Supportability policy requires the presence of a Supportability functional department and 
coordination processes that will keep Supportability factors aligned with other functional 
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tasks performed on a project or product.  If the services’ material and systems commands 
are structured functionally, then there should be a functional team responsible for 
Supportability.  As well, if the specific acquisition programs have functional teams, then 
there should be a team dedicated to the sole function of Supportability.  Where functional 
structure exists, coordination processes must be prevalent for organizational effectiveness 
and congruence.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998)  
Work flow grouping is an alternative to a functional organization structure.  A 
work flow grouping organizes members representing different functional areas to 
collectively perform the work from initiation to completion.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 
1998)  The primary strengths of work flow grouping grow out of the fact that it integrates 
all the activities required to manufacture a product or provide a service.  Work flow 
grouping does not permit the economies of scale of functional grouping.  With work 
flow-grouping there may not be sufficient redundancy among people who perform the 
same function to help or substitute for one another.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998)  If 
material and systems commands follow a work flow organization structure then 
Supportability representatives must be present on all work flow groups in order to keep 
Supportability co-equal to Cost, Schedule, and Performance.   
Integration processes are critical to the success of work flow groups and 
Integrated Product Teams.  Integration processes involve combining entities to obtain 
performance and compatibility of represented specialties present in the work flow group.  
Integration processes also involve combining organizational control systems, information 
systems, training programs, culture, and other processes such as rewards.  (Hocevar and 
Owens, 1998)  Leadership must carefully plan integration processes in order to maintain 
congruence due to the fact integration combines and involves so many organizational 
factors.  Critical to team effectiveness is common goal’s mutual accountability, and 
appreciation for the contributions of different functional representatives to the team goal.       
Integrated Product Teams commonly found in DOD acquisition programs and 
systems commands are an example of work flow groups and an ongoing integration 
process.  The assigning of members from different functional groups to a team is an 
integration process.  The functional work capabilities represented on one team provides 
the desired integration of a work flow group.  If the services are going to use work flow 
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structure then a Supportablity representative, with an equal voice to other functional 
specialties on the team, needs to be assigned to each work flow group or team in order to 
make Supportability implementation effective.  Understanding and carefully identifying 
the contextual issues [culture, support systems, interpersonal processes] will enable 
leaders to maintain organizational congruence while implementing the Supportability 
policy.  Implementations into the teams will gradually change the work flow group in a 
way that hopefully delivers the desired results, and positively impacts on the rest of the 
organization culture and contextual factors.       
A third organization structure exists which blends both the functional and 
workflow groups into a matrix organization.  In the matrix organization all members are 
assigned to functional groups.  Meanwhile, as projects or programs come along, members 
from each function are teamed together into a work flow team.  The matrix has 
competing interests between the heads of functional departments, and the program 
managers responsible for leading work flow groups made up of members from each 
functional department.  The competing interests in matrix organizations create conflict 
designed to provide a natural system of cost-benefit analysis behind actions and 
decisions.  “Matrix structures provide a continuing source of lateral linkage and 
integration, but are notorious for creating conflict and confusion.”  (Bolman and Deal, 
1997)  The members of the program teams can be caught in the middle of these conflicts 
due to their responsibilities to the success of the team and to their functional department.   
The matrix organization requires coordination and integration processes.  Political 
processes also become imperative to survive the conflict created which is a result of 
competition for limited resources.  Finally, control processes and performance 
management processes assist the organization by clarifying the confusion the matrix 
organization creates.  The competing interests and natural conflict make congruence as 
important an idea as in the previous organization structures presented.  The presence of 
common overarching goals and mutual adjustment among competing leaders to reach 
consensuses can keep the conflict manageable and produce the calculated results 
expected from the matrix organization design.  Additionally, control processes and 
carefully developed performance management processes can improve organizational 
effectiveness.  (Hocevar and Owens, 1998)           
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The implementation of the Supportability policy requires understanding the policy 
position among organization members [stakeholders] in the matrix organization [political 
environment].  A deliberate implementation plan should involve understanding the 
cultural, using the appropriate processes to leverage Supportability against other 
impeding factors, and developing consensus and coalitions in political processes.    
Acknowledging that functional, work flow, and matrix organizations exist 
throughout DOD organizations, an understanding of all three structures and related 
processes are required to implement change within the organization.  Leaders desiring 
change may wish to change a desired outcome of the organization without changing the 
organization structure through process change or improvements.  Complete 
organizational structure may need to be changed.  Keeping in mind organizational 
congruence, the desired outcomes from implementing the Supportability policy, and the 
differences between functional, work flow, and matrix organizations and related 
processes will increase the chances of successful implementation.   
 
D. POWER BASES WITHIN THE SYSTEM. 
 Power bases exist in every organization.  They can be a proponent or opponent to 
desired changes.  A power base problem within systems and materiel commands could be 
an obstacle to implementation of the Supportability policy.  The strength of members 
from some departments or competencies results in a distribution of power that may not 
provide Supportability with enough voice.  These organizations rely substantially on 
civilian labor that derives their power from expertise achieved through years of 
experience at their job, and referent power which is obtained through others’ desire to 
attain the level of expertise and expert power of the power holder (Wagner and 
Hollenbeck, 1998).  Their expert power is certified by the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act, which delineated requirements and established professional 
and administrative codes.  In the Defense Acquisition Workforce the engineers are coded 
as professionals while the logisticians are coded as administrative.  In order to balance 
out the power distribution between engineers and logisticians, the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act should be revised to create professional standards and 
certification requirements for logisticians, thereby elevating their status to professionals.     
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 Power is defined as the ability to influence the conduct of others and resist 
unwanted influence in return.  Expert power is based on the possession of expertise, 
knowledge, and talent.  Legitimate power is based on norms, values, and beliefs that 
particular individuals have the legitimate right to influence others.  Referent power is 
derived from personality, values, and goals, interacting with others with charisma that 
others find desirable.  (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 1998) 
Aldridge stated in his testimony to Congress that we needed to continue to train 
our acquisition work force.  This has to happen for logisticians as a community.  This 
training increases knowledge and should increase expert power and legitimate power.  
Similarly, logisticians must continue their training and experience, and work to be 
accepted as a professional equal in power and ability to other professions.   
 It is one thing to understand power--how to diagnose it, what are 
its sources, what are the strategies and tactics for its use, how it is lost.  It 
is quite another thing to use that knowledge in the world at large.  In 
putting the knowledge of power and influence into action-- managing with 
power-- is essential for those who seek to get things accomplished… 
Computers don’t get built, cities don’t get rebuilt, and diseases don’t get 
fought unless advocates for change learn how to develop and use power 
effectively…Developing and exercising power requires having both will 
and skill.  It is the will that often seems to be missing.  (Pfeffer, 1992) 
 
If this is the case with logisticians in our acquisition commands, then the 
logisticians as a profession are going to have to exert themselves more forcefully, 
and enhance their persuasion and negotiating efforts.  Acknowledging that 
logisticians deal greatly with the Supportability factors, they are most likely to be 
the proponents of the Supportability policy and Supportability implementation.  
The existence of power bases adds to organizational culture and context and must 
maintain organizational congruence, just as all other areas require.  The ability of 
logisticians to exist as a profession and maintain power bases equal in strength to 
other power bases in existence within DOD organizations may be critical to 
Supportability implementation.  DOD’s successful transformation to an 
organization that effectively implements Supportability factors into acquisition 
designs may require change to existing power bases.    
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E. A NEED FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION IN CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT. 
  Communication is key in managing change.  In 1997, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) published the 8th Quadrennial Review 
of Military Compensation.  This report recommended fundamental changes to the way 
the armed services managed their resources.  The process emphasized a need for adopting 
and communicating a shared vision, and for developing a strategy for moving toward the 
desired end state.  The report emphasized developing a plan for communication for 
effective change:  “For any substantial progress to be made, communication must take 
place at all levels of the organization.”   The communication plan must contain the 
message and the medium for widespread dissemination and comprehension.  The need 
for effective communication is imperative for the success of any policy changes. 
For the Supportability policy to be implemented throughout the services, there 
must be a common vocabulary that communicates the need for the policy.  At the present, 
the Army is the only service to adopt the Supportability policy.  In brief discussion with 
the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Mr. Larry Hill, he identified one reason 
that Supportability has not been made co-equal to Cost, Schedule, and Performance by 
the other services, is because they are handling Supportability as a subset of Performance.  
There is a fundamental difference in the way Supportability issues are being 
communicated, received, and thereby handled by the services. 
Implementing change such as the Supportability policy in organizations requires 
communication to take place throughout the organization with clear meaning and intent, 
leading to a shared understanding by the members of the organization.   
“Nothing will derail effective transition faster than ineffective 
communication.  It is essential to seek, and often influence opinions of 
management, peers, employees, and customers about [the] transition 
effort…Communication is so vital to the ultimate success of your 
transition plan that a mediocre transition plan communicated well will 
probably help contribute to smooth organizational change; a brilliant 
transition plan poorly communicated will undoubtedly fail.”  (McCarthy, 
1995) 
   
Problems in communication can become a major obstacle to transition efforts.  
Change can cause anxiety or confusion in organization members.  Rumors can fill a lack 
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of communication and factual information in the presence of confusion.  Eventually, if 
enough rumors and speculation are communicated, members may not know what to 
believe, management communicating transition plans, or deviations from the truth 
circulating through the work place.  McCarthy recommends a deliberate communication 
plan to assist transition plan implementation.  One challenge to think through in 
developing the communication plan is structuring messages to communicate what is 
desired.  (McCarthy, 1995)  Messages sent are not always messages received; so it is also 
necessary to solicit feedback or have dialogue with critical audiences to evaluate 
communication effectiveness.   
Structuring messages to communicate what is desired requires understanding the 
audience(s) that will receive the communication.  Different audiences may require 
different communication techniques, media, and language.  The communication plan, at a 
minimum, should ensure chosen language and vocabulary is understood by all members.  
Repetition, message consistency, and multiple media will also increase the probability 
intended communications will be received and understood.  Repetition will increase the 
chances the desired communication is heard; heard frequently enough, members will 
even remember key phrases exactly as they were stated.  Consistency of messages should 
increase understanding and members’ confidence in the validity of messages 
communicating the transition plan.  Multiple media will increase the chances of 
communicating to people with varying receiving (i.e., audio, written, video) and learning 
styles (i.e. learning through visual or experiences, written information, or through 
conceptual understanding).  (McCarthy, 1995) 
If the communication plan aligns with transition plan efforts and milestones for 
change implementation then organization commitments and transition milestones will 
match messages.  This increases understanding and the effectiveness of both the 
communication plan and the transition effort.  The members of the organization can then 
see actions taking place that coincide with what they have heard or read in recent or past 
messages.  The alignment of the communication plan with the transition plan also allows 
for a formal frequency of communication that can become predictable to organization 
members.  Like knowing when to hear the evening news on the television or radio, 
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organization members will know when to expect to hear new information and where to 
find the information.   
Feedback is required to ensure recipients understood messages communicated.   
Mechanisms to test understanding (i.e., informal interviews, debriefings, surveys) can 
assist leaders and managers in ensuring the communication plan is effective and 
messages sent communicate what is desired. 
Understanding the pitfalls of communication in organizations is essential in 
developing an effective communication plan.  Constructing a deliberate communication 
plan that supports and aligns with activities in the change implementation plan and 
maintains congruence with organization culture, personnel, processes, and other contexts 
within the organization can significantly improve the organization’s chances of 
successful change.  While the Beckhard and Harris model require leaders to identify how 
the organization will transform, the communication plan will tell the organization how 
the transformation will take place.    
 
F. HOW TO MEASURE SUPPORTABILITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN FOR EFFECTIVENESS. 
The last block on the Beckhard and Harris map of change management is 
managing the transition stage.  Once the Supportability policy is adopted in DOD, it is 
necessary to devise a method to assess the success of the changes made to implement the 
policy.  As the O-6 from the Systems Command discussed, there are problems with cost 
overruns found during the required OSD acquisition audits.  He mentioned that audits 
conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have reported gross cost 
increases in excess of the system-programmed costs six years after award.  If this is true, 
then DOD acceptance of the Supportability policy would be a reasonable policy attempt 
towards eliminating cost overruns and managing total ownership costs.  The OSD audits 
mentioned, present a measure for defense acquisition programs that could be an evaluator 
of the success of the Supportability policy.   
A simple rule of thumb for measurement of policy success would be to record the 
award cost amount of the project at inception and compare that figure to the dollar 
amount spent just six years later.  The first six years of the program will be an indicator 
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of properly incorporated Supportability factors into a new acquisition program.  New 
equipment usually has a “break-in” period where failures are experienced in the infancy 
stage.  (Blanchard, 1995)  Infant failures can be experienced as early as initial fielding of 
a new system.  If the latter (program six year cost) figure is the same (or close to) the 
previously stated award (planned, predicted, and budgeted cost) amount, then that would 
offer measured evidence of the successful implementation of the Supportability policy.  
Success here would be defined by showing that supportability factors were effectively 
incorporated in the design and development phase and resulted in minimizing cost 
overruns, at least within the six-year window of post award.  
Additional program audits should be conducted in four to five year increments 
throughout the lifecycle of a program, to assess the effectiveness of Supportability, 
achievement of maximized inherent reliability, and availability of maintenance repair 
parts and technical support.  These are the years that become more costly to DOD and the 
services.  The effect of well-planned Supportability is similar to a car owner’s 
experience.  If a car owner purchases a reliable automobile, completes payoff 
requirements, and then has no mechanical failures with the car for ten years, they are 
pleased with their investment.  The car proves to be reliable and a good investment for 
the owner.  If the car is paid off, and then proceeds to have transmission problems, engine 
troubles, and other problems that require expensive repairs, then the owner will most 
likely be displeased with his or her purchase.  The owner put money into an unreliable 
car, and continues to put additional money into maintaining the car in order to operate it 
daily.  The same type of cost problems can be seen in defense acquisition programs on a 
much larger scale.  If we continue to audit and document program costs throughout the 
program lifecycle (in four-year increments), the audits can be scheduled so that results 
can be incorporated into Quadrennial Defense Reviews that are a part of the Government 
Performance Reporting Act and service Program Objective Memorandums that are a part 
of each services formal budget appropriation process.   
In addition to periodic audits, defense managers need to identify a common 
standard for Supportability.  The common standard will add meaning to the results found 
in audits.  There are many ways to measure.  Operational readiness rates reflect 
availability of the system.  Mean time between failures reflects reliability.  AI is a 
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technical term that measures operational availability with respect to inventory levels or 
costs.  There are several measures in existence.  The important idea is that the services 
reach consensus on exactly what to measure, and how to measure so that all the results 
are in useful meaningful terms.  
 
G. A SUPPORTABILITY CHAMPION. 
 Leaders must be dedicated to participate actively in the change themselves.  For 
leaders, change means being willing to submit to the scrutiny of the entire organization 
and personally lead the change effort.  The signals leaders send through the rest of the 
organization are critical to change and their actions communicate a message to the rest of 
the organization about their commitment to strategic change.  The leader’s participation 
in implementing the policy reflects commitment and sends the message that the change is 
for real or important. (Mintzberg, 1994)  The Supportability champion needs to remain in 
position long enough to see the change through to completion; to see the organization 
through transformation.  The Supportability champion within DOD needs to be from the 
top of the organization.  Simply appointing the senior logistician within the services will 
probably prove insufficient to drive the needed changes and commitment from all parts of 
the organization.  The logisticians listening to the senior logistician talk about 
Supportability will be like a minister preaching to a choir.  It is the organization 
congregation that needs to be convinced—those outside the logistics branches; and they 
will more likely be convinced by a leader they feel responsible to.  The change champion 
must be able to influence all the services’ acquisition activities and provide a vision that 
creates a shared understanding and the resources required to change the organization and 
execute the transformation.  Currently the Supportability policy is in effect only in the 
U.S. Army.  In this instance, a champion from within the Secretary of the Army or Army 
Chief of Staff’s office is sufficient to increase focus on Supportability.  However, if the 
Supportability policy is to be implemented DOD-wide then consistency across services 
introduces the need for one policy for all services and a champion from the office of the 
Secretary of Defense.  Similar to the need for consensus on one measurement, there needs 
to be consensus on what the intended change is, and how it effects each service.  One 
champion would keep all services under the same policy.   
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The Clinton Administration required the DOD to reengineer and reinvent itself by 
the 1993 National Performance Review (NPR).  Reengineering changes work processes, 
and reinvention changes entire organizations.  The implementation of the Policy of 
Supportability as a co-equal factor to cost, schedule, and performance is very similar to 
the NPR.  Like the Supportability policy, the NPR asserts a reinvention of acquisition:  to 
manage resources, cut red tape, and use common sense.  The NPR policy had a 
champion.  The Champion was Vice President Al Gore with the support of the President.  
The Army’s Supportability Policy Champion lacks the top down enforcement for DOD-
wide enforcement.  The Supportability policy would benefit from a champion that 
stretches across DOD, Congressional, Chairman of the Joint Staff, and Service lines to 
provide the necessary momentum for success.   
  The reinvention labs created by the NPR experimented in practices, processes, 
and procedures.  Forty percent of the 120 DOD wide labs reported significant levels of 
innovation.  Out of eight factors, the number one success factor noted was “Commitment 
to reform at the top of the organization”  (Jones, 1999).  If the Supportability policy is to 
be successful throughout DOD acquisition, it will need a champion. 
 
H. MOTIVATION AND MORALE ISSUES. 
 In Chapter I, Aldridge mentioned the need to revitalize the acquisition workforce.  
From the imbalances commonly found in organizations outlined by Forsberg, et al, and 
Nadler and Tushman discussed in section B above, we assume the need for revitalizing is 
due to two things.  The first need for revitalization is possibly due to low morale and 
motivation of the workforce.  The second need for revitalization is a result of the low 
morale combined with the rewards and incentive structure for members of the defense 
acquisition organizations, which discourages new labor to accept Government Service 
positions.  This results in a Government Service civilian workforce that, as a population 
gets older over time, and has more workers with retirement interests rather than career or 
professional advancement interests. 
 Motivation is the factor(s) that initiate, direct, and sustain human behavior over 
time.  Motivator factors according to Frederick Hertzberg, are characteristics of the job 
that influence the amount of satisfaction experienced at work.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 
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1998)  It is important to understand motivation theory to see how motivation factors 
relate to the individual and the organization rewards system designed to promote 
organization successes.       
Vroom’s Expectancy theory and a correlating motivation model allows us to 
analyze and understand motivational and morale factors of the acquisition work force 
from the worker’s perspective.  Expectancy theory is a broad theory of motivation that 
attempts to explain the determinants of workplace attitudes and behaviors through 
concepts of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998) 
Valence is a measure of the attraction a given outcome holds for an individual, or the 
anticipated satisfaction the person receives from a particular outcome.  Instrumentality is 
a person’s belief about the relationship between performing an action and experiencing 
an outcome.  Determining people’s instrumentalities is important because their desire to 
perform a particular action is likely to be strong only when both valence and 
instrumentality are perceived as being acceptably high.  Expectancy, as a component of 
the model, is the belief of a link between an effort and associated success for the effort 
put into an action. 
The model focuses on three particular outcomes that leaders and managers should 
understand in when assessing the morale and motivation of the workforce; desire to 
perform, the effort put towards a task, and the level of performance.  The desire to 
perform is a result of the influence of valence and instrumentality.  The effort put forward 
is a function of the desire to perform and the expectancy (belief or expectation of 
success).  The last outcome, performance, is a product of the effort put forward, the 
ability of the individual, and the accuracy of role perception.  Steps 1 through 4 on the 
top of the model break the model into pieces to show where components combine to 
influence outcomes.  Feedback arrows stem from performance to depict the outcomes 
effect on the inputs.  These feedback arrows are important to acknowledge because they 
help depict how outcomes received for performing at some level at one time will affect 















Figure 5.  A Diagnostic Model of Motivation and Performance (after Wagner and 
Hollenbeck, 1998)   
 
 By using expectancy theory and the expectancy model presented, organizational 
leadership can begin to assess motivation and motivator factors within the organization in 
the context presented by the theory.  Understanding individual needs and motivator 
factors can then be combined into the aggregation of organizational motivator factors.  
These must remain in balance with other organizational factors to maintain congruence 
discussed in section A.     
 The following quote discusses where the individual needs and motivation enter 
into the organization, assessed by further motivation theory.   
 Much of traditional motivation theory is based on Abraham 
Maslow’s five hierarchical levels (physical, security, social, status, 
psychic), each level becoming an intrinsic motivator after the lower-level 
need has been met.  It has been our observation that any one of the levels 
maybe dominant in the particular person [based on the level in the 
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hierarchy that the individual is needing at a given time].  Some people are 
more responsive to psychic than to social incentives, regardless of how 
well their social needs have been met.  Needs can regress as the 
environment changes.  (Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000)    
 
In the previous quote, Forsberg, Mooz and Cotterman add to Maslow’s 
hierarchical theory by pointing out individuals’ needs vary at any given time, and from 
one person to the next, as comfort levels increase or decrease at each level of the 
hierarchy.  Steven Covey further elaborates this point by stating “satisfied needs do not 
motivate.  It’s only the unsatisfied need that motivates.” (Covey, 1989)  The fact that 
motivation is individualistic in nature, according to the motivation theory introduced by 
Maslow and others, the idea of understanding the motivational factors within the 
organization may be extremely complex.  The factors may be changing from one person 
to the next, or from one crisis moment to the next.  This increases the degree of difficulty 
organization leaders have when trying to determine what motivation factors are most 
prevalent to the organization as a whole.   
 The studies of industrial psychologist Fredrick Herzberg examine specific factors 
that motivate people in their work environment and those that do not.  Herzberg breaks 
down motivational factors into two categories.  The first category, termed Motivational 
factors (Achievement, Recognition, Work itself, Responsibility, Advancement) is 
positive in nature.  These factors are those that can lead to increased motivation and 
morale.  The second category, termed Maintenance factors, (Policy and Procedure 
[emphasis added], Supervision, Salary, Interpersonal Relationships, and Working 
Conditions) involves negative motivational factors.  In other words, they were found to 
lead to discontent only when missing or perceived as deficient.  (Herzberg, 1959) For 
example, pay and satisfactory working conditions reduce motivation when absent.  
“Company-wide employee relations campaigns involve maintenance factors, whereas 
motivational factors are generally in the domain of the project manager and others in a 
direct leadership role.”  (Forsberg, Mooz, Cotterman, 2000)  These motivation and 
maintenance factors can be incorporated into the expectancy model and tailored to 
increase Supportability in program management.  The organization’s reward and 
incentive structure discussed in the previous section, aligned with policy goals will result 
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in motivational factors that create congruency between the individuals, who are expected 
to produce desired Supportability results, and the organization desiring increased 
Supportability within its acquisition programs.   
The Supportability policy can be analyzed using this expectancy model.  With a 
new goal, there are new performance expectations.  The goal and the expectations must 
be clearly communicated.  The goal and expectations must be reinforced by rewards that 
are valued [valence] and linked directly to accomplishing new Supportability goals 
[instrumentality].  Logisticians need to feel their capabilities and efforts will have an 
impact [expectancy].  Thus increased motivation and morale is linked to clear 
communication of new goals, establishing performance contingent rewards and 
accountability systems; and empowering and training logisticians to be effective 
participants in accomplishing goals of supportability.   
In addressing revitalization, and focusing on motivation and morale issues, 
defense acquisition leaders and program managers can evaluate the work required of their 
workforce, the workforce’s desire to perform, effort provided, and performance level in 
terms of motivating factors and by using the presented model to predict results and 
outcomes.  These expected results and outcomes from the motivating factors and the 
expectancy theory can be looked at in terms of Nadler and Tushman’s congruency model 
for effect on the organization as a system.  The leadership can use the Beckhard and 
Harris model to identify the effects of the motivation changes on the organization, to see 
if they are aligned with the direction the organization is trying change and transform 
towards.  Ensuring the right motivational factors are present should increase performance 
and success rates within our programs and acquisition commands.  Improving the 
qualities of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy between the workforce and the 
organization should increase morale and motivation over time.  Increases in motivation 
and morale should increase the performance of our workforce, the success of our 
programs, and positively influence potential new hires considering government 
employment to augment or replace the aging and retiring members of the organization. 
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I. CREDIBILITY WITHIN THE ACQUISITION COMMUNITY AND ITS 
STAKEHOLDERS, AND WITHIN ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.   
 In Chapter III, Aldridge was quoted identifying a need “to achieve credibility” 
within the acquisition and logistics support process.  Later in the same chapter one of the 
interviewed officers referred to logisticians not having a voice in programs.  This points 
to a need for increased credibility of logisticians in the programs, and an increase in the 
credibility of the acquisition community with its stakeholders-- the American public 
represented by its elected officials.   
 
Credibility refers to the degree to which the information provided 
by the source is believable, and it is a function of three factors.  The first is 
expertise, or the source’s knowledge of the topic at hand.  The second is 
trustworthiness, or the degree to which the recipient believes the 
communicator has no hidden motives.  The third is consistency between 
words and actions.  Credibility is low whenever the source of the 
communication is either unknowledgeable, untrustworthy, or acting in a 
way that contradicts the spoken message.  (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998) 
 
The previous excerpt gives three areas to analyze to obtain an understanding of 
why the acquisition community and its members may lack credibility, and possible means 
to “achieve credibility.”  The three areas for analysis are expertise, trustworthiness, and 
consistency between words and actions.   
Expertise within the acquisition community may be a source for declined 
credibility for two reasons.  First, Aldridge identified a need to continue to educate and 
train the acquisition workforce.  The need for additional education and training is an 
identified issue from senior leaders in the government and acquisition community, that 
the desired level of expertise may not be present.   
The second reason expertise may be contributing to low credibility is the labor 
coding of logisticians.  Logisticians within the government civilian workforce fall under 
the labor code classification of 34G’s, which is an administrative class in contrast to 
professional categories containing engineers and others.  This labeling allows any 
administrative class government civilian to become a logistician without formal 
professional prerequisite training.  While the professional categories require educational 
degrees and degrees of experience, the administrative employees seeking to become 
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logisticians need only time in the government service to work their way into logistics 
positions.  Therefore there is a lack of standards of expertise within the logistics and 
acquisition community that may contribute to the lost or declined credibility 
acknowledged by Aldridge.   
Trustworthiness is the second component of credibility, and it too can be seen as a 
possible source within the acquisition community for low credibility.  Wagner and 
Hollenbeck mention hidden agendas with trustworthiness in the above quote.  The DOD 
acquisition community receives its funding and approvals from the largest political 
organization in the nation, Congress.  This leaves political and hidden agendas to be a 
part of both the acquisition community and the congressional stakeholders way of doing 
business.  (Wilson, 1989)   
Senior Executive Service officials are politically appointed.  The constituents 
across the nation elect congressmen and women to represent their individual and 
collective interests on the floors of our legislative and executive branches of government.  
While all of the politically appointed officials and the publicly elected officials may hold 
the nation’s best interest as their professional responsibility, they all have individual 
interest in supporting their constituency’s public and commercial interests.  Elected 
officials get re-elected by looking out for their constituents and bringing federal monies 
back to their state or territory.  The acquisition community has to take into consideration 
the motives and agendas of congressional committees when preparing proposals for new 
acquisition programs or post production support initiatives.  While trying to understand 
the congressional stakeholders that may be most influential to their proposal acquisition 
community representatives may dilute the acceptability or trustworthiness of their own 
credibility.   
Congress is the financial controlling agent of DOD funding, and to receive 
approval for funding from Congress, DOD officials must gain consensus.  Gaining 
consensus is required to get votes passed that will authorize budgets.  Without going into 
great detail about interest groups and political party lines, it should be understandable 
how hidden agendas are expected to be prevalent on both sides of discussion, those sides 
being represented by the acquisition community and Congress (which has varying sides 
in itself).     
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 Within the acquisition community, hidden agendas can be expected as well.  In 
most cases, a manager learns that getting ahead can come from doing what is politically 
and socially correct.  This becomes a matter of personal credibility. (Bolman &Deal) This 
can be true of our own acquisition community and the program manager’s career 
interests.  “Because getting ahead and making it to the top dominate the attention of many 
managers, both organizations and individuals need to develop constructive and positive 
ways to master the political game.” (B&D)  Part of mastering the political game within 
the acquisition community is understanding how to compete, measure, and report 
success.  Without ensuring a consistent means of measuring success criteria, the validity 
of reported data can be questioned and the career incentives and motivations may be 
temptation enough for false documentation.  The ability to manipulate statistics and 
figures can create a trustworthiness liability within the acquisition community.  The use 
of measures based on agreed-upon standards that represent the interests of multiple 
“customers” would be a good technique to reduce the likelihood of people operating on 
hidden agendas.   
 The third area to analyze is consistency between words and actions.  Congress can 
look at the rate DOD acquisition managers deliver what they said they would when 
funding was approved.  The use of past performance data may be used to assist 
congressional officials further in accomplishing previous mentioned hidden agendas, or it 
may actually be to ensure proper stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars.  Past performance 
data is usually collected by Government Accounting Office audits.  When the military 
and DOD are under the scrutiny of GAO audit, the DOD community’s credibility is at 
stake.  The loss of credibility in the eyes of our stakeholders typically results from over-
expenditure or the loss of accountability in our acquisition programs.   
 The over-expenditure or loss of accountability in acquisition programs leads to 
looking again at the consistency of words and actions within the acquisition community 
and acquisition programs.  Consistency between action and words within acquisition 
programs should be a matter of control mechanisms, and individual and collective 
responsibilities to not let preventable inconsistencies arise.  
Specific mechanisms for sharing power, responsibility, and accountability can be 
established, and in doing so should prevent inconsistency in words and actions, which is 
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determined to undermine credibility.  Collective accountability may be the key to 
loosening the burden of sole responsibility off the shoulders of the program manager.     
“Members of high-performing teams hold themselves collectively 
accountable.  Pinpointing individual responsibility is crucial to a well 
coordinated effort, but effective teams find ways to hold the collective 
accountable. Teams enjoying a common purpose and approach inevitably 
hold themselves responsible, both as individuals and as a team, for the 
teams performance.”  (Bolman and Deal 1997).     
 
Visualizing Project Management advocates the use of documentation or a memorandum 
of charter for each project.  This charter  “sets the tone for teamwork by accepting 
personal accountability for the proposal made by the team.” (Mooz, et al, 2000).  The 
collective accountability seems more likely to establish an effective policy of 
supportability and with proper management, better control of credibility, responsibility, 
accountability, and equity for all team members.  Collective accountability within 
programs would increase reliance on logistics expertise and thereby raise credibility of 
logisticians on program teams.  Logisticians would need to back up their roles and 
responsibilities with professional credentials that warrant the title of experts.  Lastly, to 
increase chances of program success, hidden agendas must be prevented from arising and 
changing the direction of a program. 
       
J. CULTURE OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE ACQUISITION COMMUNITY. 
 There are many terms and definitions for the word culture.  Wagner and 
Hollenbeck (1998) define culture as “the shared attitudes and perceptions in an 
organization that are based on a set of fundamental norms and values that help members 
understand the organization.”   
[C]ulture [is] a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the 
organization’s members.  These beliefs and expectations produce norms 
that powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups…Norms are 
expectations about what constitute appropriate or inappropriate attitudes 
and behaviors, socially created standards that help us interpret and 
evaluate events.  Although their [norms] content may vary, norms exist in 
all societies and, while often unnoticed, are pervasive. 
[T]wo distinctions need to be kept in mind.  First…there is an 
important difference between the guiding beliefs or vision of top 
management and the daily beliefs or norms held by those at lower levels in 
 63
a unit or organization.  The former reflect top managements’ ideas about 
how things ought to be; the latter define how things actually are.   
A second distinction to note about the central norms that may 
define an organization’s culture is that norms can vary on two dimensions: 
1) the intensity or amount of approval/disapproval attached to an 
expectation; and 2) the crystallization or degree of consensus or 
consistency with which a norm is shared.”  (O’Reilly, 1989) 
 
In the previous quote, O’Reilly provides a clear description of what organizational 
culture is, how it relates to every member of the organization, and how it can easily be 
misunderstood at different levels of the organization.  The organization structure, rewards 
structure, motivation and morale factors influence the beliefs and expectations.  Change 
champions model new norms that influence organizational culture.  Clearly 
understanding the organizational culture is key to influencing change.  The norms, 
values, and beliefs of the organization members have to be influenced or convinced to 
accept the proposed changes if organizational leadership expects to be successful in 
implementing change.   
 “The important point is that there is nothing magical or elusive 
about the culture.  One has only to be clear about the specific attitudes and 
behaviors that are needed, and then to identify the norms or expectations 
that promote or impede them.” (O’Reilly, 1989)    
 
Supportability policy implementation as a co-equal factor to Cost, Schedule, and 
Performance, may require organizational culture understanding and change.  There are 
two significant ideas to remember when dealing with organizational culture.  The first 
idea is an understanding that the members of the organization primarily maintain 
organizational culture inside their minds.  While some organizations may try to document 
the prevailing or desired culture, and depict it in some form of symbol, it is shaped and 
embraced by the people of the organization every day in every action.  Changing the 
beliefs inside members’ minds may require significant repetitive reinforcing actions or 
statements.  Creating the Supportability policy may be insufficient to expect change to 
occur in favor of desired Supportability outcomes.  Members may be inclined to read the 
policy statement and believe it to only be a temporary policy letter that will not be 
enforced.  The leadership has to take extra measures to change the beliefs in the minds of 
the members and thereby change the culture.  The second idea to remember when dealing 
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with organizational culture is that it can naturally change continuously in small amounts, 
but forcibly or intentionally cannot be changed immediately.  Culture is a result of many 
inputs and processes coming together and slightly changing the organization positively or 
negatively.  One action can be remembered and have impact on the culture for a long 
time.  At the same time, deliberate attempts to change culture that lack proper 
consideration and application can have little to none of the desired effect on the 
organization. 
 “Think carefully about how residual disputes will be resolved and 
underlying norms enforced.  This may mean establishing special 
procedures for settling disputes that arise.  It may also mean relying on the 
courts.  It is preferable to rely on “alternative dispute resolution methods” 
if possible, to keep conflicts out of court and to encourage all-gain 
solutions that increase the legitimacy and acceptance of the policy, 
strategy, or plan and the outcomes of conflict management efforts.  (Fisher 
and Ury, 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Gray, 1989)  It is also 
important to remember that the court of public opinion is likely to be 
important in reinforcing the norms supporting the new changes.   
 Remember that major changes, and even many minor ones, entail 
changes in the organization’s culture…Leaders, managers, and planners 
should facilitate necessary changes in cultural symbols and artifacts, 
espoused values, and underlying assumptions, recognizing that it is far 
easier the change the first two than it is to change the third.  Indeed, 
heavy-handed attempts to change underlying assumptions are more likely 
to promote resistance and rejection than acceptance.” (Bryson, 1995)    
 
 Culture is a result that is established over time.  It cannot be completely controlled 
by leadership, as the members of the organization equally influence culture.  It is critical 
to the success of the Supportability policy, that the defense organizations accept this 
policy as a new way of doing business and adopt the change as a new norm.  The 
organizational culture must be aligned with the Supportability policy, and in turn the 
policy measures and reward systems will reinforce the espoused organizational culture.   
Culture is an important component to maintaining balance and fit within an 
organization as well as increasing member commitment to the organization.   
“Symbols embody and express an organization’s culture--the 
interwoven pattern of beliefs, values, practices, and artifacts that define for 
members who they are and how they are to do things.  Culture is both a 
product and a process.  As a product, it embodies accumulated wisdom 
from those who came before us.  As a process, it is continually renewed 
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and re-created as newcomers learn the old ways and eventually become 
teachers themselves.”  (Bolman and Deal, 1995)   
 
The supportability policy is the direction setting by our leaders in DOD.  Specific 
to this thesis is the leadership and direction setting initiated by the Department of the 
Army.  The change management theories we have discussed throughout are the 
managerial throughputs that can facilitate or ease policy implementation if addressed 
early and effectively.  Culture is a result of policies we input (direction setting) and the 
management techniques we apply as throughputs of the systems model, among other 
things.  Achieving culture intensity is linked to several points previously made: 
champion, communication, rewards linked to performance where goals reflect 
Supportability outcomes.  Additionally, consensus through structures that enable 
logisticians full engagement of logistics and other relevant expertise, shifts in power, and 
increases in credibility improve culture and congruence.  Our outputs and outcomes are 
also results, but our focus here is the culture.  Culture significantly determines the 
behavior of the organization.  Culture establishes and shapes over time. (Bryson, 1995)  
The only means we have to effectively influence or change culture is by using the change 
management models and tools we have discussed throughout this thesis.   
 If the culture is properly framed, the resistance to change and rejections of 
acceptance can be strategically addressed.  Culture will not change over night, but if 
leaders are cognizant that the barrier exists, then the leaders will have a better 
understanding of the change road that lies ahead, and the need to effectively 
communicate a common vision to all members of the organization.  Cultural changes can 
be critical inputs to congruency, and should be addressed to assess whether they support 









V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. SUMMARY.   
In addressing the issue of cost-effectiveness of acquisition programs and weapon 
systems, there is a lack of Total Cost Visibility of lifetime ownership costs, as illustrated 
in Blanchard’s iceberg model.  The Logistics support for any military weapon system or 
vehicle once fielded comprises the majority of a program’s cost over its lifetime of use.  
The costs grow higher and higher each year due to age of the system and lack of attention 
to supportability during design and testing.  Because these hidden costs of supportability 
can be as high as 75% of the total life cycle costs, the Army secretariat wrote the policy 
of Supportability co-equal to cost, schedule, and performance.  The Department of the 
Army created the Supportability policy to respond to a Department of Defense need to 
identify weapon system total ownership costs and be better managers of defense dollars.  
We proposed that the Supportability policy would be useful DOD wide.  Army wide or 
DOD wide, the Supportability policy needs implementation assistance for success and 
obtaining desired results and outcomes.  
This thesis analyzed changes required to effectively support the implementation 
of the new Army acquisition policy of “supportability as a co-equal factor to cost, 
schedule, and performance.  The Beckhard and Harris model presented a change 
management model to guide transformation and implementation of the Supportability 
policy.  We addressed the policy as an implementation requirement and addressed some 
of the transformations necessary to facilitate successful implementation to produce 
positive results, not only for the Army but for the entire Department of Defense. 
Twenty-five prominent individuals throughout major systems, operational, and 
materiel commands were interviewed.  The following is a summary of the top ten issues 
that we identified from the interviews possibly requiring change management attention 
for successful policy implementation.  Recommendations accompany each summarized 
issue.   




B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.   
1. Obtaining and maintaining organzizational fit and balance is critical in 
achieving intended transformation outcomes and results.  In addressing this area we 
introduced the congruency model by Nadler and Tushman to understand “fit” within the 
organization.  Maintaining fit and balance keeps members of the organization satisfied 
with the organization and work required.  Satisfied members and a balanced organization 
should minimize focus on resource constraints and keep focus on working effectively 
within the constraints.  Supportability implementation requires implementation that 
maintains or improves organizational fit and results in the desired results expected from 
the policy.  Failure to acknowledge fit and failure to maintain fit could result 
implementation failure.   
Recommendation.   Conduct organizational assessments to identify the 
organizational factors in existence in each organization applying congruency theory.  
Likewise, analyze implementation actions for effect and fit with the organization.  If the 
organization fit factors are not seen in the vision of the desired future state of the 
organization, then implementation efforts may be blindly coordinated.   
   
2. Alignment of rewards and incentives facing program managers should 
improve implementation of Supportability policy.  Program managers reward 
subordinate performance that contributes to the program manager’s definition of success, 
which is further defined by the perception of what he/she is rewarded for.   
Recommendation.  Create rewards and incentives, both individual and team 
oriented, that will create a desire to achieve greater Supportability factors in acquisition 
programs and products.  Rewards directed towards meaningful achievements must avoid 
fascination with easy to see or measure criteria.  Team rewards and shared responsibility 
will aid the reward system in refraining from rewarding obvious and individual 
behaviors.  Avoid hypocrisy in the reward system at all times to make the supportability 
policy implementation successful.  The stated reward system builds expectations in 
organization and team members.  If work performed does not result in expected reward 
from the stated reward system, confidence in the organization’s commitment to 
Supportability will decline.         
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 3. Understanding the structures, the required communication, coordination, 
control, integration, and political processes that relate to each particular structure 
and their influence on organization culture and context are significant to 
implementation strategy.  Organizational structures vary in DOD.  Functional, work 
flow group, and matrix structures are found within the DOD acquisition community.  
Processes are key to keeping members in the organization fitting with the structure and 
other organizational factors (i.e., technical structure, culture, rewards structure).  
Functional structures will rely heavily on coordination processes.  Work flow groups and 
Integrated Product Teams will rely more on integration processes.  Matrix organizations 
will require both coordination and integration processes as well as a third critical political 
process.  Incorporating implementation strategy via the right processes relative to the 
type of structure is key to maintaining congruence and success of the policy. 
   Recommendation. Analyze organizational structure of our organizations for 
effective structure design given the tasks and work desired of the organization.  The 
organization structure must agree with leaders’ vision of the organization at the desired 
future state following transformation.  Also analyze effective use of processes by 
managers and leaders given an agreed upon structure, and incorporate Supportability 
implementation measures through techniques that use the appropriate processes for each 
type of organization.     
 
4. Supportability implementation requires the support of a power base strong 
enough to measure up to opposing power bases.  Power bases within the organization 
exist for various reasons.  The important understanding with regard to power bases is 
whether the bases support or oppose the leadership and the desired change.  The 
interviews conducted, and the creation of the Supportability policy suggested that 
logisticians may be lacking sufficient power base to keep Supportability factors at the 
forefront of every acquisition program along with Cost, Schedule, and Performance.   
Recommend logisticians as a professional organization increase their power base 
in organizations by increasing professional knowledge and expertise through continued 
education, professional certification, and the creation of a professional Logistics code in 
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government service labor classifications.  The present career progression of a government 
civilian from any administrative classification into a position of a logistician is 
insufficient for creating a power base that will equal other power bases in DOD 
organizations.     
 
5. Effective communication in change management is critical to achieve the 
desired changes and outcomes of Supportability policy implementation.  As 
McCarthy stated, “a mediocre transition plan communicated well [will have a greater 
chance of success] than a brilliant transition plan poorly communicated.”  The 
communication plan is an important tool for the transition plan and the process of 
determining “how to get there from here” on the Beckhard and Harris Change 
Management process map.  The communication plan needs to carefully select timing, 
method, and language of communication to organization members and stakeholders to 
ensure the message sent matches the intended message received.    
Recommendation. Develop a communication plan that supports a Supportability 
implementation plan and incorporates careful thought into audience, message structure, 
communication techniques, repetition, and consistency.  The communication plan needs 
to be aligned with the plan developed to “get there from here,” in the Beckhard and 
Harris model.   
 
6. Supportability policy effectiveness requires measures to create 
accountability.  The past performance of acquisition programs resulted in cost overruns 
possibly due to a lack of control systems and a lack of consensus on usable measures.  A 
common standard will add meaning to results.   
Recommendation.  Service leaders must establish a control system to review 
programs for cost performance and Supportability results using a common agreed 
measure.  An audit process with common measures creates a control mechanism that can 
be tied to reward systems, incorporated into budget processes, and supports 
Supportability implementation and desired results.  
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7. A Supportability champion is necessary to keep the Supportability policy a 
priority.  Leaders must be dedicated to participate actively in the change themselves.  
The leaders send signals through the rest of the organization that show commitment or a 
lack of commitment to the spoken changes.   
Recommendation.  DOD implementation of the Supportability policy requires an 
empowered champion be identified at the DOD or Secretary of Defense level.  The 
Supportability champion needs to be someone with sufficient authority to preside over all 
the services, and remain in position long enough to see the change process to completion.  
The change champion needs to be directly involved and incorporated into the 
communication plan previously discussed.   
      
8. Motivation and morale issues may be limiting the productivity and 
effectiveness of the acquisition workforce.  Motivation is driven by factors that initiate, 
direct, and sustain human behavior over time.  Motivator factors are characteristics of the 
job that influence the amount of satisfaction experienced at work.  If motivation and 
motivator factors are ineffective in creating worker satisfaction then productivity will be 
low, new hiring may be difficult, and other problems may arise.   
Recommendation.  Assess motivator factors currently used in the acquisition 
community and DOD organizations for effectiveness and worker satisfaction.  Upon 
identifying what is motivating workers and what is depressing workers, incorporate 
Supportability implementation by connecting it to the motivator factors.  Create rewards 
and incentives that are desirable to workers, and make the rewards and incentives 
attainable through adherence of the Supportability policy and producing the desired 
results of the policy.  Assess the motivator factors for fit within the organization and 
congruence with the desired end state.  Ensure they contribute to the effort of “getting 
there from here,” and not moving away from the desired direction for the organization. 
    
9. Credibility within the acquisition community and its stakeholders, and 
within acquisition programs needs to increase.  Logisticians may be lacking credibility 
with their counterparts on acquisition programs or in systems commands.  Additionally, 
due to past program cost overruns there may be a lack of credibility with acquisition 
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proponents and congressional stakeholders.  Credibility can be assessed in terms of 
expertise, trustworthiness, and consistency between words and actions.  Sharing power 
and collective accountability may be a means to create equal credit for success on 
programs, which can increase everyone’s credibility at the same time.  Success over time 
of programs should increase consistency of performance in the eyes of Congress.   
Recommendation.  Logisticians (responsible for Supportability factors) must 
strengthen their professional credentials that warrant the title of experts.  Create a system 
of collective accountability on acquisition programs that will benefit everyone when the 
program is successful.  Reward the program participants collectively for the presence of 
Supportability factors that will increase system performance and keep total ownership 
costs predictable and acceptable.  This will increase collective efforts, build credibility 
over time, prevent hidden agendas from becoming a detractor from trustworthiness and 
consistency between words and actions, and finally aid in Supportability implementation.   
 
10. Culture is an important component to maintaining balance and fit within an 
organization as well as increasing member commitment to the organization.  The 
change management theory presented by Beckhard and Harris and the congruency theory 
presented by Nadler and Tushman can facilitate or ease policy implementation if 
addressed early and effectively.  Culture is a result of policies we input and the 
management techniques we apply as throughputs of the systems model.  Culture 
significantly determines the behavior of the organization and establishes itself over time.  
The only means we have to effectively influence or change culture is by using the change 
management model and tools we have discussed throughout the thesis.   
Recommendation.  Leaders must be aware of their organization’s culture.  The 
behaviors and the organizational culture need to be matched against the desired results 
intended from the Supportability policy and the desired future state of the organization 
presented in the Beckhard and Harris model.  Without a culture that is supportive and 
receptive to leadership’s input and requests for change, all unintended consequences may 




The above issues are recommendations that suggest there is more to implementing 
policy than just issuing one.  There is material and information in this analysis to draw 
conclusions pertinent to this study and be considered for policy implementation, change 
management and long-term organization success through fit and balance.   
 
C.   SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Just as acquisition is the tip of the iceberg, so is policy effectiveness.  Our 
research recommendations focus on those topics most likely to pay dividends to solving 
the problem of our current aging systems have revealed, and serving the total cost 
identification of future programs.  Some of the additional areas relative to DOD interests 
in this area are the following: 
 
• If supportability measures are established, then a control system is 
needed to measure Supportability effectiveness in programs.  
Recommend further research involve methods to control and use of 
resulting information.  
 
• Should the Program Manager be held fully accountable for these high 
cost overruns to the point of legal action?  Should the accountability be 
shared by the entire team?  Should Program Managers and program 
members become disassociated with a program after two, three, or four 
years when the program is going to continue for twenty or thirty years?   
   
• There are legitimate “gripes” within our organizations that were 
revealed during the interview process.  An analysis of the proper 
feedback system may assist management in hearing the complaints 
that may be symptoms of larger problems or may be addressing a 
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